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1. Introduction  
 
Politics is very commonly perceived as a struggle for advancing particular visions 
of society and economy over competing ones. In order for the ideas to be successfully 
promoted, politicians resort to strategies which are meant to formulate and disseminate 
their goals in the most compelling and attractive way which increases their chance to 
become resounding with the citizens and attract votes at the expense of other candidates.  
Once political agenda representing such goals is set up, politicians do not content 
themselves solely with verbalizing it, but seek for ways to instill their understanding of 
surrounding reality with all its socio-economic aspects upon possibly biggest number of 
people. In order to do so, they develop narratives which are meant to exploit already 
existing shortcomings of the state in providing environment fostering well-being of the 
public and create sense of unfair treatment of the disadvantaged coupled with abuse of 
power or negligence in providing social services. Such narratives may also shape 
imaginary visions of magnified or non-existing problems which would help politicians to 
win public support and discredit their opponents. These measures, to various extent, are 
generally attributed to populism which, though considered to be a highly contested 
concept, is often classified by scholars as a form ideology (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, 
pp. 2-4). Currently, the interest in explaining populism shown by the academic 
community is associated with the rise of both right and left-wing political parties and their 
charismatic leaders which operate both in consolidated democracies and post-communist 
countries alike.  
As the matter of fact, Poland has proven to be not entirely immune to populism 
following the collapse of communist regime in 1989. Throughout its recent history, there 
were several political parties which were frequently labelled as populist, with right-wing 
League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin) and Self-Defense party (Samoobrona) 
considered the most prominent. However, populism is not limited solely to political 
ideology, as it is often referred to as a form of rhetoric used by politicians in order to 
garner popular support. Therefore, populism can be analyzed also as a strategy of 
generating statements about reality in order to promote certain social attitudes and 
political program.  
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Not only does politics require mastering the use of language and transforming it 
into a sort of art of communicating and persuading, such as rhetoric, but also mobilizes 
political actors to construct complex forms of language organization which facilitate 
political identification with their utterers on one hand, and help to garner support on the 
other. Such undertakings take form of political discourses which, due to their 
multidisciplinary character, cannot be boiled down to a single conceptualization. In this 
thesis, discourse, as a part of politics, is studied primarily from the standpoint of political 
science, without neglecting its linguistic properties as crucial to its manifestation. 
As there are multiple definitions of political discourse, the term itself might be 
used by many scholars in variety of ways. First, discourse, as understood by French 
philosopher Michel Foucault whose works on the role of discourse in politics constitute 
a valuable contribution in the field of political philosophy, pertains to historically 
contingent production of meaning and knowledge which translate into social practice 
(Foucault, 1972, pp. 135-138). Foucault’s concept of discourse is centered around 
discussion of power and truth as modes of conducting discursive actions and influencing 
perception of what is true or false, right or wrong etc. Thus, Foucauldian take on political 
discourse concerns relations of power in politics and ability to construct visions of reality 
as effective in society rather than uncovering objective truth.  
Foucault’s interest in the role of discourse in shaping political reality translated 
into growing popularity of political discourse analysis as a sub-field of political science. 
From amongst variety of disciplinary approaches differing both in ontological and 
epistemological properties, one stands out as a combination of study of linguistic 
properties of speech and its influence on social practice in political realm. This approach 
is known under the name of Critical Discourse Analysis and draws heavily on Foucault’s 
ideas, but offers a more rigid methodology of study of discourse in both theoretical and 
practical dimensions. For the purpose of this thesis I have selected Norman Fairclough’s 
theory of CDA as the most appropriate methodological framework for study of Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski’s speeches for the reasons presented below.  
First of all, as Henderson points out (Henderson, 2005, pp. 2-5), interdisciplinarity 
of CDA constitutes its primary asset. Faircloughian approach attaches importance to the 
use of language often neglected by various studies of power in politics, and offers a 
7 
 
combined analysis of linguistic properties of text and role of ideology in shaping power 
relations and social practice. Moreover, it presents a multi-faceted model of study for 
political scientists, linking objectively occurring events and social phenomena with 
attempts to discover presuppositions which underlie linguistic conventions of social 
behavior and allow for sustainment or change in power relations. Thus, CDA 
demonstrates that social phenomena are filtered through language on one hand, by 
assigning particular meaning to explain, justify or reject them, and linguistic phenomena 
are partly social phenomena, evincing certain patterns in the selection of wording or 
rhetorical devices. In other words, Fairclough’s model facilitates tracking of linguistic 
properties of speech not only on intertextual level or frequency of use, but also by looking 
at how they reverberate within society through social mobilization or reflection of 
textually-presented social relations in real life. In the case of Kaczynski texts, this will 
apply especially to the concept of raison d’etat advocated for in his texts, and social 
recognition of discursively constructed cleavages based on populist binary opposition, 
further explicated in the following chapters.  
Secondly, CDA provides a comprehensive, three-dimensional model of analysis 
which can be easily operationalized. On the first level, the analysis of texts enables to 
discern their linguistic properties and offers insight into structure of texts and their 
coherence. This, in turn, allows for interpretation of texts, i.e. uncovering of what is 
expressed directly, what is implied indirectly or remains elliptical. Interpretation helps to 
define elements of discourse as it demonstrates ways of representing reality and visions 
of social relations. Finally, on the level of explanation, CDA links social structures (e.g. 
type of political regime or institutional setting) with social practice. As Henderson points 
out (Henderson, 2005, p. 6), by incorporating a conceptualization of social practices 
developed by Harvey (1996) as comprising discourse, social relations, material practices, 
rituals, routines as well as values, beliefs and desires, Fairclough establishes a dialectical 
relationship between social events and social structures where both are communicated 
through social practice. In the case of Kaczynski speeches, relationship between social 
structures (democracy, EU membership) and social events (advocacy for actions related 
to or stemming from author’s concept of truth as well as advocacy for rebirth of moral 
values of the state) communicated through discourse becomes a subject of textual 
analysis, interpretation of meaning, and explanation of their salience for or impact on both 
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social relations (social cleavage around desirable model of state) and social structures 
(enactment of legislation).  
Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis involves study of power relations in 
politics and uncovers political role of ideology and values in shaping popular 
conventions. In line with Foucault’s thesis on the productive capabilities of discourse, 
CDA explores how powerful political actors construct conventions of social interaction 
and impose standards on language and behavior according to their ideological posture. 
As this thesis incorporates the concept of thin-centered populism developed by Mudde 
and Kaltwasser (2017), Kaczynski’s discourse is analyzed by tracking its ideological-
populist features and defining its constitutive elements in order to determine whether they 
make up distinct order(s) of discourse. Minimalistic approach towards populism helps to 
avoid pitfalls of conceptual stretching, and enables to focus on the role of binary 
opposition between the people and the elite as essential to contemporary manifestations 
of populism (Mudde, 2004, pp. 560-561), including Law and Justice and Kaczynski’s 
populism, as discussed in chapters 2 and 3.  
 Finally, another strength of applying CDA to investigate Kaczynski’s speeches 
consists in the adoption of speech act theory, proposed by Austin (1962). The author 
grouped utterances into three separate categories of locution, illocution and perlocution 
on the basis of their linguistic properties and purpose. Additionally, Austin developed a 
more detailed classification of illocutionary acts which Fairclough’s CDA complements 
with three values of discourse (experiential, relational and expressive), thus placing them 
in the context of discourse analysis of their impact on social interaction. Hence, 
conceptualization of speech acts is operationalized through Critical Discourse Analysis 
as it explicates how semantic properties of texts add up to the creation of conventions of 
meaning which can be interpreted and explained (second and third level of CDA) in 
relation to their social implications.  
1.1. Selection of cases  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I have selected following speeches by Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski: 
- Electoral victory speech delivered on 25th of October 2015,  
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- Speech delivered on 10th April 2016 at the rally commemorating 6th anniversary 
of the Smolensk airplane crash,  
- National Flag Day speech delivered in the Sejm on 2nd May 2016,  
- Independence Day speech delivered on 11th November 2016,  
- Speech delivered on 1st July 2017 at the 5th Party Congress  
 
The author of these speeches is considered one of the most charismatic and 
influential figures in the history of the post-1989 Poland (Cienski, 2016). He has been 
elected a member of parliament for 7 out of 8 tenures of the Sejm and served as Prime 
Minister of Poland in 2006-2007. He has been a chairman of Law and Justice party since 
2003, having a large impact on its political orientation and performance as prescribed by 
the party charter. Currently, Kaczynski is considered to be a mastermind behind political 
success of PiS in 2015, though he did not assume any public office and remains an 
eminence grise of contemporary Polish politics (Cienski, 2015).   
I have established several criteria for the selection of speeches for analysis. First, 
as Law and Justice party was able to secure an overall majority of seats in the Sejm in 
2015 and exercise power unprecedented in the history of post-1989 Poland, all speeches 
evoked in this paper were delivered within timespan of 2 years (2015 – 2017). This 
facilitates gaining an insight into how anti-establishment discourse of thin-centered 
populism promoted by PiS after it came to power was put to work by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had been a prominent figure associated with political elite 
in Poland since the beginning of democratic transition. Furthermore, selected texts 
analyzed in the following chapters share a set of concepts which traverse all of them, and 
make them crucial elements of Kaczynski’s discourse even though they differ in terms of 
circumstances in which they were delivered. Finally, selection of cases was possible 
thanks to their availability online in full rather than in extracts or quotes. I have excluded 
parliamentary debates from the analysis as they present a different, less continuous form 
of political expression due to strict time limitations on one hand, while often involving 
reiteration of statements made during party conferences and public speeches on the other. 
Three of selected speeches were delivered during organized events (electoral convention, 
party congress, parliamentary celebrations on the occasion of National Flag Day) or more 
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spontaneous ones such as the rally for commemoration of Smolensk airplane crash and 
the Independence Day anniversary. The character of these speeches depended also on the 
context – the electoral victory speech features a laudatory form, praising common effort 
of the party members, Smolensk catastrophe speech is commemorative and moralistic in 
character, party Congress speech includes motivational accents while the two speeches 
delivered on national holidays are more celebratory – moralistic.  
All speeches were transcribed in Polish from video recordings. Extracts selected 
for the analysis have been translated into English. 
1.2. Research objective and questions  
 
The main research questions which I am going to discuss can be formulated as 
follows:  
- What are the properties of Kaczynski’s discourse in light of Fairclough’s CDA?  
- How is the ideational (conceptually thin-centered) and discursive (understood as 
a rhetorical measure) populism reflected in selected speeches and what assumed 
beliefs and conventions does it generate?  
- How is Kaczynski’s discourse institutionalized?  
Drawing on the analysis of textual properties of Kaczynski’s speeches, I am going to 
investigate how core elements of Kaczynski’s discourse correspond to the concept of thin-
centered populism, and how they translate into promoted conventions and beliefs about 
society and political elites. This will allow me to demonstrate empirical implications for 
Polish politics, especially with regard to the legislation adopted by PiS-dominated 
parliament.  
1.3. Thesis organization  
 
 This Master’s thesis is divided into four chapters. In chapter 1, I shall present 
various understandings of political discourse, its properties and component parts, and 
discuss its salience for political science. In separate subsections, I am going to explain 
what bearing contextual use of language has on political phenomena and (re)presentation 
of reality as well as what role the concepts of truth, power and ideology perform in 
discourse. Next, I shall focus specifically on providing characteristics of Critical 
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Discourse Analysis as the main concept underlying my study, its background, premises 
and conceptual framework. Alongside its methodology, I am going to discuss what 
philosophical and scientific approaches to study of politics and discourse are brought 
together in Fairclough’s theory, and how such conflation of concepts is put to work.  
 In chapter 2, I shall proceed to discuss problematic conceptual issues related to 
populism and advocate for a thin-centered definition of populism as avoiding pitfalls of 
concept stretching and operationalization difficulties. Furthermore, I am going to 
highlight differences between ideational and discursive notion of populism and 
demonstrate how these can overlap.  
 Third chapter provides an outline of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s political record in post-
1989 Poland and reasons for his status of prominent figure in domestic politics. In this 
part of my thesis, I shall make an attempt to identify Kaczynski’s political rationale, 
describe axiological foundations of his discourse and his party’s ideological orientation. 
Next, I am going to analyze how the populism represented by Kaczynski matches with 
the thin concept of populism developed by Mudde and Kaltwasser, and explain its 
contribution to the landslide electoral victory by PiS in 2015.  
 In chapter 4, I am going to focus on conducting textual analysis of Kaczynski’s 
populist discourse by analyzing extracts of selected speeches, and providing 
interpretation thereof. The study is organized along principles and values identified in 
Kaczynski’s texts; this allows to reflect on the core elements of his discourse and 
conclude what speech acts are used, what social conventions his discourse rests 
on/formulates as well as what orders of discourse, i.e. clusters of conventions 
underpinning social practice (in case of selected speeches, advocacy for action) can be 
detected.  
 Final chapter draws on previous textual analysis and interpretation of Kaczynski’s 
speeches but focuses on possible impact these texts may have on social structures, as per 
Fairclough’s understanding. Therefore, in this chapter I shall exemplify how Kaczynski’s 
discourse permeates legislative action and manifests itself in various pieces of domestic 
legislation in Poland.   
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2. Chapter One – Methodological framework 
 
 In this chapter, I shall introduce theoretical framework of Fairclough’s Critical 
Discourse Analysis and discuss conceptualizations of discourse and threefold construct 
of social life as consisting of social events, social practices, and social structures. My 
explanation of CDA shall be preceded by a short description of underlying understanding 
of political discourse and its elements as well as a brief cross-disciplinary overview of 
approaches towards language and language use as drivers behind social perception of the 
reality and social change. Furthermore, I am going to reflect on a three-dimensional model 
of operationalization of CDA, speech act theory, and argumentative-deliberative 
character of politics. 
2.1. What is political discourse analysis? 
 
It is of high importance to explain what the political discourse analysis actually is 
before I move to analyze the chosen texts. Although it is rather a wide concept with 
various understandings depending on the field of study or an emphasis a researcher wishes 
to put in order to highlight its particular features and properties, there are several points 
that should be listed as its pillars. In the case of political discourse analysis, as Theun van 
Dijk argues (van Dijk, 1997, p. 11), it is crucial to determine and explain the 
circumstances in which the adjective political can be applied – it is linked with issues 
which can be found on political agendas or characterize politics itself understood as a way 
of decision-making over issues pertaining to society. The first such notion is power in 
politics. In defining it, Fairclough draws on Foucauldian understanding of power in 
relation to knowledge production which is conveyed to the public through discourse 
(Fairclough, 1989, p. 213). Since politics does not exist in separation from society, power 
relations between political actors are covered by discourses and explained by discourse 
analyses. Moreover, various demonstrations of power such as dominance, abuse of power 
or struggle for power are the core element of both politics itself and political discourses 
which serve as a verbal externalization of power relations in the society. All of them can 
also be reproduced by discourses (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 11-12). According to Norman 
Fairclough (Fairclough, 1989, p. 1), discourse analysis has two significant values – it 
underscores the role of language, as an often underestimated driver behind production, 
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preservation and change in the socio-political life, and makes people aware of its impact 
on the unequal social relations between individuals and within groups. Therefore, 
discourses cannot emerge without political actors who create and (re)shape them, and 
need to involve some group of addressees or recipients, as van Dijk puts it, in order to 
perform their communicative role (van Dijk, 1997, pp. 13-14). Furthermore, it is 
important to stress that political discourses are not ends in themselves and cannot be 
applied without taking into account the context of utterances. Thus, they are means that 
political actors resort to in order to achieve particular goals in a given political context  
(van Dijk, 1997, pp. 13-14). Although we can think of some groups as seemingly non-
political or not involved directly in politics, they become politicized once they are placed 
on the public debate agenda. Political discourse, thus, includes two components - 
contextual use of language and social practice, i.e. manifestations of enforced discourses 
in social relations and domination of some representations of reality over competing ones.  
Social interaction, as Fairclough argues (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 2-3), is founded 
upon certain common-sense assumptions which are implicit and often hard to discern. 
They can be, however, manifested in conventions which people use in their everyday 
communication. Fairclough defines such assumptions as ideologies. They are closely 
linked to power and reflect the characteristics of social behavior which is inscribed in the 
conventions used in social interactions, also in linguistic terms since language is the 
primary tool for conveying messages  Therefore, discourse analysis attempts to display  
ideological patterns in texts which have political consequences in the form of socially 
shaped and maintained conventions which contribute to the range of diverse social 
phenomena such as inequality, hierarchy, dominance, oppression etc. According to 
Chilton (Chilton, 2004, pp. 6-7), socialization becomes a mode facilitating the rise of 
groups and coalitions which attempt to pursue their interests by implementing 
communicative/discursive techniques in order to gain advantage over the others.   
2.2. The role of language and language use in discourse 
 
Political parties are one type of groups actively employing discursive 
instrumentation. As Paul Chilton points out (Chilton, 2004, pp. 18-19), language itself 
and the choice of wording becomes a crucial tool of communication for politicians, but 
its function extends far beyond managing the flow of information and encompasses also 
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the design of political agenda and delivery of ideologized message in spite of tacit 
downplaying of the role of language by politicians themselves. Furthermore, people are 
generally able to not only represent things and social phenomena but also meta-represent 
them, i.e. reproduce, interpret, identify valid information and evaluate its credibility by 
means of language. Chilton argues, following Hockett’s claim, that language provides 
individuals with symbols which are detached from their referent. At this point, it is useful 
to invoke the model elaborated by a Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure which allows 
for a more comprehensive grasp of the idea of language as consisting of two parts – 
langue and parole. The author views the former as a system or structure universal for all 
members of a given community that provides them with instruments to express their 
thoughts verbally. Parole, on the other hand, is a language use which Saussure believes 
to be a linguistic variation of the way individuals apply langue. However, as Fairclough 
contends (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 20-22), the use of language does not depend entirely on 
the choice made by an individual and underscores the role of social interaction as the 
main factor determining communication. What is more, langue itself is hardly a unitary 
and invariable structure and the access to or use of standardized forms of language can 
encounter some social or geographical limitations. Therefore, if language use and the 
language itself are socially determined, any changes regarding its application are also 
contingent on the social change.  
Another important part of the Saussurian model is the difference between what he 
calls signifiant and signifie, i.e. signifier and what is signified. The relationship between 
these two elements is arbitrary and the production of meaning stems from social 
conventions rather than from intrinsic nature of words. Signs are engaged in the interplay 
through which they can obtain meaning differing from other signs. They are incorporated 
into language structure and are made applicable through parole. In the light of Saussure’s 
theory, social conditions are excluded and substituted by networks of signs which are 
shaped in relation to others. Their applicability can, however, be random or invalidated 
over time, that is why the notion of langue becomes a primary focus for linguistic studies 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 9-11) 
Discourse analysis steps in to provide a feasible alternative to the limitations of 
Saussure’s constructionist approach (exclusion of social conditions of language 
production) and its exclusion of social factors. In order to understand its historical 
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premises, it is crucial to invoke the works by Michel Foucault as the theoretical 
background for further analysis.  
2.3. Truth as an element of discourse  
 
First of all, Foucault makes several important remarks regarding the interplay 
between relations of power and knowledge which determines what is considered as truth. 
In an interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino, he conceptualizes truth 
in terms of its society-derived procedures which have effects of power on politics. As he 
explains (Foucault, 1988, pp. 131-132), each society generates its own regime of truth 
which take a form of discourse types serving as benchmarks to distinguish true and false 
statements about reality. Politics is viewed by the author as a battle around truth rather 
than battle for truth; regime of truth can emerge when the true is separated from the false 
in discourse where the former is assigned with effects of power, i.e. marking its social 
and economic significance for state politics. Therefore, truth manifested in discourse is a 
system of statements which can be regulated and reproduced by the power holders on one 
hand, and enable to change or sustain power relations on the other. Thus, knowledge about 
what is true and false is seen not merely as a product of observation of objective reality 
but can also be shaped discursively in various representations of the world out there.  
For Foucault, power as a concept cannot be limited solely to juridical mechanisms 
which circumscribe and delineate acceptable scopes of action (Foucault, 1988, p. 119) 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 12-13). He rejects such repressive quality of power and 
focuses on power understood as a capability to permeate social structures and produce 
knowledge which is communicated to the public through discourses. As Jorgensen & 
Phillips point out (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 14), as truth is constructed discursively 
as a product of power, a search for the universal truth is rendered futile since the purpose 
of analysis of political discourses in Foucauldian terms is to identify their properties and 
explain how they are produced and diffused in the society, and not whether they 
accurately reflect surrounding reality. Therefore, as Foucault sees power as productive 
rather than repressive (Foucault, 1977, p. 194), it has a bearing on shaping people’s 
desires and needs. Power-generated knowledge is inculcated in the society by structures 
of norms and rules which are constructed in order to promote desirable types of behaviors. 
However, as Daldal points out (Daldal, 2014, pp. 164-167) Foucault shies away from 
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seeing power relations as vertical, top-down imposition of power by the rulers over the 
ruled. Instead, he acknowledges production of information as occurring on various levels 
and not being derived and confined to any state ideology. For instance, Foucault sees data 
collection on the population carried out by the police as a necessary bottom-up 
contribution to the development of knowledge which can be used by the powerful in the 
battle around truth as explained earlier in this chapter. Moreover, Foucault remains 
skeptical about the role of ideology in power relations (Simons, 2015, p. 63) as he sees it 
only as representations of ideal world rather than materializing in rules governing 
people’s behavior, though he does not reject it as irrelevant to production of knowledge. 
In general, however, his understanding differs slightly from Althusser’s approach as 
presented below. 
As another important contribution to the understanding of discourse thanks to its 
focus on the interplay of power and ideology, Louis Althusser’s structuralist theory 
focuses on the ideological state apparatus and interpellation (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, 
pp. 15-16). According to his theory, individuals become subjects of ideology through 
interpellation, i.e. the use of language which attributes a social position to them. The 
ideology itself is defined as a system of representation which obfuscates real relations 
between members of society and constructs imaginary ones as a result of ideological 
domination. Interpellation is employed as a an act of exercising hegemony, and places 
various degree of discourse production and distribution within various social groups 
depending on power relations and ability of agents to turn individuals into subjects of 
ideology.  
Although Althusser’s vision of the state power may resemble the concept of 
repressive power rejected by Foucault, the author draws distinction between repressive 
(police) and ideological state apparatuses (church, schools etc.) with the proviso that their 
practices can evince elements of both (Simons, 2015, pp. 64-65). Therefore, when 
Althusser discusses the role of ideology in the state apparatus, he claims that ideology 
can be materialized via social practices, and not only in normative legal acts. As a matter 
of fact, interpellations in Althusser’s theory refer to social practices which, in Foucault’s 
terms, contribute to the emergence or sustainment of regimes of truth by promoting 
particular discourse, i.e. system of statements about truth. Moreover, as discourse 
presupposes systemic arrangements or system of statements, Althusser’s definition of 
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interpellations, though formulated chronologically earlier to the philosophy of Foucault, 
meshes with the latter’s concept of regime of truth as acceptation for truth as a 
representation of family relies strongly on successful interpellation of individuals and 
mobilization to act according to discursively prescribed modes of behavior. 
 Although there are several divergent points in the theories described above, they 
are all an important contribution to the field of discourse analysis thanks to their 
acknowledgment of substantial role language performs in shaping the perception of the 
world and emergence of regime of truth reinforcing a particular vision of reality and social 
relations. It becomes a part of social practice (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 22-23), i.e. it is 
internalized in social relations and becomes a socially conditioned process. Power 
relations bring about the imposition or domination of one discourse over another and both 
ascribe and validate certain roles and features to individuals and groups accordingly. Even 
though the existence and role of any universal truth is a matter deserving further debate, 
one can surely state that truth production and representation becomes a primary focus of 
political discourse in achieving domination. However, Fairclough argues (Fairclough & 
Fairclough, 2012, p. 4) that such measures notwithstanding, it is the political advocacy 
for a particular agenda which requires contextual use of language and generation of 
regime of truth in the production of prevailing meaning and representations. Therefore, 
what agents do is of primary importance for Fairclough’s discourse analysis.  
2.4. Critical Discourse Analysis – sources, goals and conceptual framework 
 
 Having described generally what political discourse is and deals with, it is 
important to move on and focus on the type of discourse analysis selected for this thesis, 
namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). However, before I proceed to explain the 
elements of this approach, its premises and goals deserve to be highlighted and focused 
upon in the first place. Following van Dijk’s remarks (van Dijk, 1995, pp. 17-18), there 
are several crucial features which are striking with regard to the conceptual grounding of 
Fairclough’s model. First of all, strength of CDA is a problem-oriented rather than 
paradigm-oriented approach – it is concerned with phenomena which are present in 
modern societies such as inequality, dominance, xenophobia etc. Its main purpose is to 
identify patterns in texts and talk which account for the presence of veiled presuppositions 
and conventions which strengthen and enforce them upon various members and groups 
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of society. Since CDA has to do with a broad range of issues having an impact on the 
society, it offers a multidisciplinary orientation towards their disclosure and description 
of its consequences for social cognition, politics and culture. Furthermore, it helps to 
explicate ideological aspects of those social phenomena and techniques which allow 
powerful agents to enact and legitimize a desired state of affairs which works best to their 
advantage or facilitates accomplishment of their particular political goals. Thus, CDA 
attempts to reveal manipulation and manufacture of consent (van Dijk, 1997, p. 25), as 
van Dijk puts it, in order to demonstrate the ways of exercising control and influencing 
people’s consciousness with regard to the perception of reality.  
Therefore, CDA constitutes what Warzecha calls a semiotic starting point in 
studying social processes where discourse is both constituted by and constitutive to them 
(Warzecha, 2014, pp. 169-170). As Encarnacion Hidalgo Tenorio argues (Hidalgo 
Tenorio, 2011, pp. 187-188), CDA became a way of questioning and challenging the 
status quo by providing individuals with incentives for self-reflection on the modes of 
ascribing meaning and generating conventions of social behavior through language and 
ideology. To quote the author, “CDA seeks to expose the manipulative nature of 
discursive practices, and improve communication and well-being by removing the 
barriers of assumed beliefs legitimized through discourse” (Hidalgo Tenorio, 2011, pp. 
187-188). CDA aspires to make recipients aware of discourses being both constitutive in 
terms of various perceptions of the world as well as constituted by social relations 
(Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 61).  
CDA is by no means a unified and homogenous way of analyzing discourses, it is 
rather a common name for a variety of approaches developed by different scholars who 
tried to link textual analysis with a study of socio-political phenomena. Amongst the most 
prominent ones should be listed Van Dijk’s Socio-Cognitive Discourse Analysis, Ruth 
Wodak’s Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), Duisburg School, Fairclough’s 
Dialectical-Relational Discourse Analysis, and many others. In the case of the last model, 
a social conflict viewed in semiotic terms constitutes a basis for the analysis of social 
processes. Therefore, the meaning of statements is studied by taking into account its scope 
and dimension, and is complemented by adding structural analysis of context in order to 
discern the patterns of discourse application in socio-political actions (Hidalgo Tenorio, 
2011, p. 190). Fairclough contends (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 23-24) that politics has an 
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apparent linguistic nature since political struggles are manifested in language on one 
hand, and concern the language on the other. Texts are a product of a wider process of 
social interaction which gives a platform to the development of discourses  Moreover, 
political discourses cannot occur outside of political context, i.e. they are constituted and 
sanctioned by the institutions which allow political agents to make their political agenda 
resounding in the society due to its societal implication and impact on the life of other 
members of society (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 17-18). Therefore, textual 
analysis of political utterances cannot be carried out without paying close attention to the 
processes of meaning production and interpretation as well as conditions under which 
they occur (Fairclough, 1989, p. 25).  
As social life is a basis for the emergence of discourses, Fairclough proposes a 
three-dimensional framework for its conceptualization (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, 
p. 82). The author claims that social life is comprised of social events, structures and 
practices. The latter perform a role of mediator between social events which are seen as 
examples of actions or behavior occurring within social structures, which serve as 
systemic drivers behind social action and change, for instance polities. Social practices in 
this model are equivalent to ways of acting and representing locked within frames and 
conventions (public debate, conference etc.) Fairclough and Fairclough differentiate 
between various types of social practices such as genres (ways of acting), styles (ways of 
being) and, most importantly, discourses (ways of representing). 
Critical discourse analysis is centered around language manifested in political 
discourse and social practice. Therefore, it requires an analytical framework which 
reconciles various levels of forming and use of discourse. Fairclough operationalizes 
these levels in a three-dimensional model which consists of description, or analysis of 
textual properties, interpretation, where analyzed texts become a resource in the process 
of deliberation of meaning, and explanation, as the manifestation of context-embedded 
ramifications of discourse implementation and social interaction (Fairclough, 1989, p. 
26).  
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In order to analyze discourse without separating it from its social setting, 
Fairclough introduces the concept of orders of discourse which is meant to cast more light 
on the conventions which underlie the shape of the discourse itself (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 
29-31). The author speaks about orders of discourse and social orders as interrelated 
networks which are structured around particular modes of action taking place in a social 
space. Both types of orders pertain to different examples of practice, though the former 
can actually be seen as a type of social order per se because it encompasses these practices 
which have discursive character. The application of various discourses within a given 
order of discourse depends on the institutional backdrop and relations of power between 
individuals or groups which are subjected to discursive action. At this stage, conventions 
began to play an important role since they are templates which guide agents’ behavior 
and allow for a choice of an appropriate mode of communication. Therefore, orders of 
discourse can be categorized according to the clusters of conventions based on their 
frequency. However, it is not only social conditions and conventions they generate that 
influence discourse itself; such relation works also the other way around. Discourses may 
have an impact on social conditions because once it becomes institutionalized and 
promoted by powerful agents, it may contribute to social change through discursive 
practice. Moreover, if discourses are created within social structures on one hand, and can 
influence them on the other, they can also be reproduced in the case of shifts inside society 
which have an impact on institutions and social relations themselves. Therefore, as 
Fairclough argues (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 37-40), the relationship between structures and 
 Figure 1 
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discursive practices is dialectical – both influence promotion of a particular mode of 
reasoning.  
2.5. Power and ideology in Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Power as defined in CDA is closely related to knowledge production and 
dissemination of social conventions of interaction. There are three types of power 
constraints listed by the author – constraints upon content, relations, and subjects. In the 
first case, what can be done or said is limited by the prevailing narrative enforced by 
powerful actors. The other two are closely interlinked since the relations become 
conventionalized and confined in terms of applicability of certain types of utterances and 
behavior, whereas subjects refer to the subject positions which participants are meant to 
occupy in these relations (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 45-46). Furthermore, power can be 
accumulated behind discourse through the consolidation of social order of discourse 
which leads to the standardization of a particular type of language that reflects power 
relations in the society. The access to discourses is controlled and can be constrained by 
the powerful agents by erecting institutional barriers which preclude other people from 
entering, and thus disrupting the process of discourse-shaping. The main instrument 
limiting the access to discourses is formality which entails the elaboration of an 
institutional routine which helps to decide on granting the possibility to enter discourse 
for these individuals who meet unilaterally introduced requirements. Formality is 
expressed in language conventions and its use which validate the communication process 
(Fairclough, 1989, pp. 55-65).  
Another important part of Fairclough’s model includes ideology as an underlying 
concept of political discourse. As an introduction to the analysis of its role in exercising 
power and domination over the members of society, the author invokes the notion of 
common sense presented by American sociologist Harold Garfinkel, who viewed it as 
constitutive for the perception of the world expressed in common assumptions and 
expectations voiced by people. In his understanding, manifestations of common sense 
serve as a setting for all actions undertaken by the members of society as well as the 
interpretation of such actions made by them. These assumptions and expectations are 
often expressed subconsciously and their utterers are deemed to take them for granted. 
Therefore, Fairclough argues (Fairclough, 1989, p. 83) that common sense becomes a 
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powerful mechanism used in the implementation of discourses due to its implicit 
character.  
A particular understanding of common sense can be generated by ideologies. Its 
basic function is concentrated around sustaining unequal power relations in the society in 
order to impose discourse upon weaker actors. Once individuals become aware of the 
workings of ideology, it loses its commonsensical feature, becomes compromised and 
may not be able to prevent the state of inequality of power from being altered. Successful 
functioning of ideology requires ensuring its implicitness and depends on the degree of 
public consciousness regarding the motivations and reasons of promotion and advocacy 
of topics offered by discourses. Ideologies can work only if they are presented as 
background assumptions which are not subject of dispute; rather they constitute the basis 
upon which deliberation takes place. Therefore, formulation of assumptions in texts 
should lead to the desired interpretation of them by their addressees (Fairclough, 1989, 
pp. 84-85). It comes as a result of what Fairclough defines as a discursive struggle 
(Fairclough, 1989, pp. 85-92), i.e. capacity of ideology employed in discourses to win 
advantage over other ideologies and dominate them or contain them by appropriating 
some elements of oppositional discourses, distorting them and imposing a deflected 
understanding of their premises and postulates upon them. If the dominance is achieved 
and alternative discourses are stifled, the prevailing discourse and its ideology becomes 
naturalized and seen as an objective reflection of the world. Naturalization of discourse 
can be seen as means to achieve the common sense in discursive terms. Moreover, a fixed 
meaning is the primary product of naturalization of discourses. The conventions 
embodied in the routines of communication adopted by the members of society become 
commonsensical in terms of their understanding and interpretation. The closure of 
meaning and creation of a consistent language shared by other people within society 
becomes a clear sign of discursive dominance.  
2.6. Values in Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourses oftentimes reflect the values championed by their creators who seek 
to promote them at various levels of communication. Fairclough distinguishes three such 
values – experiential, relational and expressive. In the case of experiential values, 
discourses serve as means of expressing and externalizing their makers’ experience of the 
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society and nature of things they bring up in their utterances. Therefore, the constraints 
which discourses impose upon the contents of interaction may be affected by some 
personal perception of affairs they pertain to, as externalized by the powerful agents who 
generate them. Next, the relational value is to do with the social relationships which are 
enacted via text in the discourse (Fairclough, 1989, p. 112) Perception of social roles and 
relations of power are a primary feature to which this kind of value refers. Finally, 
expressive value is related to the presentation and evaluation of social phenomena which 
may have their roots in culture or can be a product of historical events which had an 
impact on social relations and sense of group or national belonging. Thus, the 
categorization of the values can be presented as in Figure 2 (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 74, 
112) 
Dimensions of meaning 
and constraints  
Values Structural effects 
Contents Experiential Knowledge and beliefs 
Relations Relational Social relations 
Subjects Expressive Social identities 
 Table 2  
 
As Fairclough contends (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 114-119), words can be classified 
on the basis of their quantity and repetitiveness. The extensive use of the same words or 
synonyms which amounts to the so-called overwording is a sign of a particular emphasis 
which their authors put on chosen aspects of reality which they deem to be ideologically 
crucial to the successful conveyance of their message. In this sense, products of discourse 
have experiential value. Furthermore, the choice of wording has its consequences for the 
social relations since it may entail enforcement of particular conventions and advocacy 
of a state of affairs which is ideologically desirable for its promoters. They may present 
and support their vision of society by showing alternative developments to which negative 
impact is attached. The expressive values step in when this juxtaposition becomes a 
subject of evaluation through the application of the set of expressions which the author 
believes to be the most effective in inculcating and maintaining the type of identity which 
is the most desirable.  
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The values which I described above become operative once a social interaction 
occurs. Texts feature various values which are embedded in the common-sense 
assumptions. However, when it comes to the reception and interpretation of texts, their 
addressees resort to what Fairclough calls members resources (MR), or background 
knowledge, though it is more precise to talk about assumptions and conventions rather 
than knowledge in the strict understanding of this word (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 140-141) 
2.7. Level of interpretation 
 
The process of interpreting texts takes place at multiple levels. The most basic one 
relates to the interpreter’s familiarity with the language structure in which the text is 
created. It encompasses the knowledge of grammar, vocabulary and phonology. The 
second level is of highly semantic character since it is to do with the meaning of words, 
i.e. the identification of information which the word carry within grammatical structures. 
The next level relates to what Fairclough calls a local coherence which is tantamount to 
the production of coherent interpretation based on the analysis made at previous levels. 
The adjective local refers here to a particular part of the text being studied and explained. 
Finally, the analysis of the overall text structure allows for drawing conclusions with 
regard to its global coherence or determination of the key points upon which the 
argumentation is elaborated and advanced throughout the text (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 143-
144).  
However, there is a range of other important factors which influence the 
production and shape of texts as well as settle them within a particular social setting. As 
Fairclough points out (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 153-155), it is indispensable to see political 
discourse as based upon historical events which have had an impact on the current 
political developments which are reflected in the texts and speeches delivered by 
politicians. Texts can also draw on their predecessors in order to manifest ideological 
continuity and coherence through years, and create a base in a form of presuppositions to 
which their producers and addressees can resort while interpreting the contents. 
Therefore, the ability of powerful political actors to incorporate the elements of 
intertextuality, i.e. drawing upon the legacy of earlier texts, may translate into ability to 
determine presuppositions. The historical context within which a particular text is set has 
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an impact both on the MR (members’ resources) and interpretation of texts by the 
recipients. 
2.8. Speech act theory and Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Speech act theory, as a part of CDA, constitutes an important part of the study of 
selected Kaczynski’s speeches as it provides a classification of speech acts according to 
which elements of his discourse can be identified and categorized. Speech acts are seen 
as a crucial part of pragmatics which deals with the meanings discourse participants 
ascribe to various elements of a text according to their MR (Fairclough, 1989, p. 155). 
Speech acts can be defined as utterances which are voiced in a particular context, and 
with a certain intention such as statement, warning, promise etc. John L. Austin, British 
philosopher of language, offered a typology of speech acts depending on their purpose. 
The author lists three of them - locution, illocution and perlocution. Locutionary act is 
equivalent to uttering a sentence  with a given semantic meaning whereas illocutionary 
and perlocutionary acts refer to the intention of a speaker (informing, warning and so on), 
and the reception and reaction of the utterance by an addressee ( for instance persuasion, 
dissuasion and convincing) respectively (Austin, 1962, pp. 108-109).   
Austin proposes also a classification of speech acts which can be useful for the 
current analysis of Kaczynski’s texts. The five main categories mentioned in his work are 
verdictives, exercitives commissives, behabitives and expositives which are differentiated 
on the basis of their contextual use. Verdictives refer to judgements, exercitives pertain to 
the instances of exercising power and exerting influence through speech, commissives are 
linked to the expression of intention and obligation, behabitives are equaled to 
externalization of feelings, attitudes and dedication, whereas expositives refer to the 
development of argumentation (Oishi, 2006, p. 3). All of these are important with regard 
to the Critical Discourse Analysis because they carry not only semantic meaning, but are 
also, to some extent, a reflection of contextually embedded conventions motivated by 
power relations. On top of that, Fairclough does not introduce his categorization of values 
as an attempt to replace Austin’s classification, but in order to provide a common 
denominator to these statements which possibly may fall into various categories, 
depending on their contextual use. 
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2.9. Politics in Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 Finally, it is important to explicate the characterization of politics which can be 
found in the texts of the prominent political discourse analysts mentioned above. As 
Fairclough & Fairclough argue (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 22), politics is 
oriented towards decision-making which can ground action. Decision-making is 
supported by argumentation and becomes important to Fairclough’s CDA model since it 
is viewed by the author as a complex speech act containing both illocution and 
perlocution. On the one hand, argumentation is perlocutionary in the sense of advocating 
for actions and not being an action in itself, but on the other it envisages the 
implementation of illocutionary acts such as warning or admonition which would support 
its cause (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 23). The authors claim that argumentation 
can be understood as “a social and rational activity of attempting to justify or refute a 
certain claim and aiming to persuade an interlocutor […] of the acceptability (or 
unacceptability) of a claim” (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 36). For the purposes of 
a successful argumentation, rhetoric seen as a study of aiming for effectiveness is 
employed. In line with this definition is the idea of rhetoric being means to convince the 
audience in favor of a particular mode of action rather than provide people with logically 
sound argumentation. Political agents decide to implement rhetoric as a part of their 
discourse in order to draw attention and shape perception of citizens about issues they are 
interested in (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 57-58). In Fairclough’s understanding, 
practical argumentation aims at generating proposals for action on the basis of arguments 
presented through rhetoric. Any argumentation, even if it is not based on solid, logically 
proved premises, maintains its strength and capability to influence people’s opinions as 
long as it is not rebutted by a more persuasive and convincing one (Fairclough & 
Fairclough, 2012, p. 66). This falls in line with the Foucauldian concept of regime of 
truth, where truth itself is not confined merely to the observation of objective reality, but 
is considered a groundwork for development of system of statements and proliferation of 
knowledge inferred from it. 
 CDA incorporates the idea of imaginaries as discursive representations of the 
world which is actually not there, but which is deemed to be an ideal one. Both the 
representation of the actual, existing world and of the one which is presented by 
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imaginaries take shape of discourses thanks to their semiotic features. They can be 
employed by argumentation through presenting the imaginary as actual, or real, in order 
to gain recognition for these veiled imaginaries. Once the non-actual is recognized by the 
public, it can get perpetuated through institutionalization of imaginaries. As Fairclough 
and Fairclough put it (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 108), an institutional reality that 
is collectively recognized assigns deontic powers to people and gives them reasons for 
action. The performative power of imaginaries is projected by creating a system which 
generates the rules limiting or enabling human action. Therefore, the ability to present 
imaginaries as manifestations of an actual world as well as enforcement of recognition 
and compliance with the premises are clear examples of power and domination exercised 
in the society (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 109-110). However, there is another 
important factor which is deemed to be necessary to make discourses work – 
legitimization. Following van Leeuwen’s proposition, Fairclough and Fairclough classify 
four different types of legitimation – through authorization, moral evaluation, 
rationalization and mythopoesis (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, pp. 109-110). 
Authorization is made by invoking the opinion of experts which supports proposed 
actions, moral evaluation seeks to attach a positive meaning which would validate them, 
rationalization can be applied in order to present the actions as useful or effective, and 
mythopoesis involves mythmaking. Finally, when Fairclough and Fairclough speak about 
deontic powers in terms of the theory of argumentation, they mean a type of power which 
is based on reasons independent from actual desires of the people. Instead, what matters 
is the recognition of the need for action and its legitimization granted by the audience 
irrespectively of their private inclinations (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 114).  
2.10. Summary 
 
 All in all, CDA as proposed and developed by Fairclough is an eclectic concept, 
combining various philosophical and scientific disciplines and theories with their 
premises. It incorporates the linguistic perspective of Saussure’s and Austin’s works as a 
basis for the analysis of various political implications of the language use in social 
relations. The constructionist approach contributes to this type of CDA by highlighting a 
distinction between a language structure (langue) and use of words (parole). Moreover, 
Fairclough incorporates Austin’s speech act theory as a useful methodological tool 
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allowing for a classification of utterances into three categories – locutions, illocutions, 
perlocutions, and five subcategories, what is particularly handy in systematizing analysis 
of speech acts used in political discourse as well as provides. Apart from the linguistic 
part, philosophical take on the role of discourses in the society is also present in CDA. 
Fairclough draws on the works by Foucault, Althusser, Garfinkel, from which he derives 
a variety of concepts that are constitutive to his model of CDA – the perception of truth 
as a product of discourse rather than an objective entity, ideology as a product of 
hegemony manifested in interpellations and formation of social conventions, Garfinkel’s 
notion of common sense as well as argumentation theory. Finally, the three-dimensional 
conceptualization of social life as social events, structures and practices, the interplay 
between social reality and formation of discourses, introduction of the concept of orders 
of discourse as influencing and influenced by social orders and categorization of values 
which influence knowledge, beliefs, social relations and social identities as well as the 
modes and conditions of interpretation, all allow for operationalization and application of 
Fairclough’s methodology in practice, i.e. analysis of political texts and its implications 
in the socio-political context.  
 Fairclough’s model of CDA is valid for the study of Kaczynski’s speeches for 
several reasons:  
- It brings together a textual (speech acts) analysis, interpretation (argumentation 
theory) and socio-political impact,  
- It provides a set of conceptualizations and categorizations which enable to 
systematize the study and its outcomes 
- As it provides a critique of the phenomena existing out there, CDA helps to 
identify how thin-centered populism is operationalized not only in political 
speeches, but as a result of real-life results of political action, in this case as a 
legislation.  
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3. Chapter Two – Populism and its relation with discourse 
 
In this chapter I am going to investigate populism as a highly contested 
phenomenon in terms of its conceptualizations and highlight its relationship with 
discourse. By discussing populism and opting for a minimal approach to studying it, I 
attempt at providing a clear understanding of the core element of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s 
political discourse as based on the irreconcilable interests of the people and the 
establishment. Populism is, therefore, a concept for the analysis of discourse on one hand, 
and a central feature of PiS chairman’s texts on the other, and as such deserves much 
attention. 
 
3.1. Populism - conceptual framework  
 
 Populism as an analytical concept, constitutes another crucial part of this paper. 
Although often perceived by many as the main buzzword of 21st century (Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 1-2) a blurry notion of populism has been studied in its relation to 
democracy. The latter may be defined according to its procedural or systemic 
characteristics, i.e. boiled down to a combination of popular sovereignty and majority 
rule where emphasis is put on a mode of collective decision-making or encapsulated as a 
political system which, besides procedures, fosters institutions safeguarding rights and 
liberties of citizens. This broader understanding of democracy pertains to liberal 
democracy (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 80). As far as populism is concerned, it is not 
intrinsically undemocratic; rather populists oppose the institutional system of checks and 
balances as contradictory to the principle of people’s rule. Therefore, populism may not 
be considered a threat to democracy itself by many, but it challenges liberal character of 
modern democracies, undermining their pillars by rejecting pluralism and driving a 
wedge between various social groups or demonizing minorities. Populism, while 
fostering procedural aspect of democracies by mobilizing people to use democratic 
process to exercise their authority, comes as a peril to liberal democracy since by 
privileging the will of the people, it may lead to escalation of social conflicts by 
prioritizing majority rule over equality of rights, and moralization of politics which 
substitutes problem-solving through public deliberation with stigmatization of dissenting 
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voices that are excluded from the volonte generale (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 82-
84) In fact, the opposition between the people and the others, or rather the moral and the 
immoral is essential to the type of populism which will be discussed more broadly in this 
chapter, and particularly concerns Kaczynski’s populism.  
 Populism is inextricably linked with the analysis of speech which comes as a valid 
criterion in determining what and who can be called populist. In order to get their message 
across, populists use discourse as a way of instilling ideational conventions about socio-
political reality in a form of rhetoric. Populist discourse, as defined in terms of binary 
opposition between the people and the elite, needs to be vocalized by a charismatic leader 
which is discussed later in this chapter. 
As Paul Taggart argues, populism permeates modern representative democracies 
as an element of tense competition between plurality of worldviews which seek to 
challenge system that gave rise to them (Taggart, 2004, p. 269). However, unlike classical 
ideologies which are traditionally placed on the right-left scale, populism often neither 
represents a consistent set of political values nor does it always have a capability to sustain 
momentum and take roots in party politics. Therefore, political scientists provide a very 
diverse selection of definitions of what may be called populism.  One such 
conceptualization is draws upon a distinction between feelings-driven politics and 
rationalism. As Mudde puts it, populism refers to the politics of the Stammtisch (the pub), 
i.e. a highly emotional and simplistic discourse that is directed at the gut feelings of the 
people (Mudde, 2004, p. 542). On the other hand, populism becomes synonymous to 
demagoguery or political technique of collecting votes by offering ready-made solutions 
and clear division of the good and the evil (Mudde, 2004, p. 543), However such 
definitions are difficult to operationalize as it is problematic to measure emotions or 
rationalism in politics. Yet, it is possible to discern several features of populism which 
various contributions to the study of this phenomenon share.  
 As Taggart contends, populist groups often grow quickly, manage to mobilize 
dissatisfied voters around couple of postulates, celebrate a dazzling but short-lived 
success, only to vanish due to inability to keep their popularity (Taggart, 2004, p. 270). 
Therefore, due to its volatility, populism seems to be an all-encompassing term for certain 
abnormalities which disrupt political landscape before and shortly after elections, but are 
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not able to dwell long due to shifts of public support or lack of core values. However, 
populism can be analyzed also as a defining feature of particular political system. 
Following Canovan’s taxonomy, Taggart lists four cases – populist democracy, populist 
dictatorship, reactionary populism and politician’s populism. All of them share one 
component which becomes crucial for narrowing down its conceptualization – appeal to 
the people and resentment towards the elite. Taggart argues that populism can become a 
political force when it is sanctioned by institutions of representative democracy; 
otherwise it remains just a technique of attracting voters’ attention (Taggart, 2004, pp. 
272-273). As Ben Stanley points out, antagonism between the people and the elites draws 
on the idea of popular sovereignty, and therefore takes on an ideational rather than 
structural form (Stanley, 2008, p. 95). Therefore, populists, as advocates of a sovereign 
people, seek to ensure a better government rather just a bigger representation, and thereby 
challenge the mandate of elite to govern (Taggart, 2004, p. 273). Sovereignty itself is 
based upon premise that the people are the source of authority, yet it remains unclear 
whether the term people pertains to some collectivity or just group of individuals 
(Canovan, 2004, p. 250). 
 The term people itself is quite vague and may have various connotations – it may 
be synonymous to nation as a community of shared history, culture and language, or 
pertain to any undefined segment of society. On the other hand, as Mudde argues, it 
presents also a rhetoric tool which populists use in order to attract more public attention 
(Mudde, 2004, p. 545) Interestingly, Taggart favors a term heartland instead of the people 
when he discusses what populists attempt to represent.  In author’s opinion, heartland 
stands for a romanticized vision of the past as a repository of fundamental values which 
should serve as a guidance to the people, but are currently under threat posed by the elites. 
It is by no means a unitary concept as it lacks core values and cannot be classified as an 
ideology; rather, it is based on a rejection of otherness and desire to break with a current 
system (the establishment) which exploits the weak (the people). The role of oppressor 
can be ascribed to domestic government officials or supranational bodies and foreign 
bureaucrats, as in the case of Euroscepticism. Thus, a return to the values of heartland is 
postulated against the background impression of moral crisis and institutional incapability 
to deal with extraordinary situations (Taggart, 2004, pp. 274-275). Obviously, the feelings 
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of fear, social injustice, moral decay of the elites etc. may be imaginary and do not 
correspond to the reality; they need to be activated by populist leaders.  
 Populists usually prefer to be referred to as grassroots movements uniting various 
social groups rather than political party, and need charismatic leader in order to maintain 
their popularity. Although they reject party nomenclature and gain support by voicing 
criticism towards bureaucratized forms of authority, populist movements are no less 
organized than classical political party which is dictated by their very nature – by relying 
on charisma of one leader, they face a problem of succession which would be hard to 
resolve without robust, many-tiered structures which do not differ much from classical 
political parties (Taggart, 2004, p. 276). Furthermore, populist leaders often emphasize a 
democratic mode of individual, conscience-based decision-making among party ranks, 
while, at the same time, relying on their authority as the representatives of the people who 
dare to confront the establishment and advocate for the weak. Thus, by showing their 
dedication to the people’s democracy and support for procedural instruments of direct 
democracy such as referendums, populists present themselves as empowering people and 
transferring more authority to them.  
 Jaroslaw Kaczynski can be considered a populist charismatic leader for a number 
of reasons. First, as Mudde and Kaltwasser point out (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 
62-64), populist leader possesses qualities enabling him to establish a cult of leader and 
construct an image of a man of action truly representing the people’s voice. Discourse of 
populist leaders draws heavily on creating a sense of crisis which requires an immediate 
action based on popular common sense. Therefore, their charisma relies on the ability to 
mobilize electorate on the basis of personality traits on one hand, while providing a 
rationalization of ready-made solutions which appeal to possibly the broadest number of 
people. The strength of Kaczynski’s charisma, as a long-standing head of Law and Justice 
party, is based on his ability to present himself as a statesman and a talented speaker, who, 
however, takes on a role of political mastermind behind government actions and does not 
assume any political position (Cienski, 2016; Foy, 2015). At the same time, in his 
speeches, he manages to articulate what he claims to be the people’s will (citizen-friendly 
state apparatus, improved social protection and security provided by the state, emphasis 
on the sovereignty vis-à-vis democratic deficit in the EU and presence of values in public 
life associated with broadly understood patriotism), and exploit public dissatisfaction 
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with political elite and appeal to the rising ambitions of Poles, especially Polish middle 
class.  
 Therefore, the quality of state and democracy remains crucial to populists. Indeed, 
democratic deficit is another important element on populist agenda. As populists claim to 
represent the people, they speak in favor of direct democracy. Thus, they present 
themselves as mediators in the process of transferring authority back to citizens. As 
Canovan points out, populists tend to prioritize referendums as universal modes of 
popular decision-making, by-passing professional politicians and undermining their 
legislative and executive mandate (Canovan, 2004, p. 242).  
 Euroscepticism is another constitutive feature of modern populism in Europe. As 
Taggart argues, populists often present regional integration as a threat to the heartland, 
i.e. core values upon which people identify and sovereignty rests. An idyllic picture of 
heartland is juxtaposed with a complex bureaucracy of the EU as a foreign body which 
does not possess legitimacy of the people. By delegating certain authority to this 
institutional leviathan, the elites are believed to trade sovereignty in exchange for personal 
benefit. Moreover, adoption of many attributes of modern state such as common currency, 
removal of internal trade barriers, free access to the territory and labor market of other 
states/provinces of the EU resembles an establishment of a super-state in which national 
identities dissolve (Taggart, 2004, pp. 277-279). Although populists do not deny 
advantages of close economic cooperation, they put forward Europe of nations as an 
alternative concept to the supranational EU.  
 Currently populism is viewed as a constant element of political landscape in 
Europe. It became a part of mainstream politics both as a technique and thin ideology. A 
mediatization of politics manifested in growing commercialization and independence of 
(social) media outlets coupled with cognitive mobilization of voters made populism a part 
of mainstream politics. Not only did new populist parties emerge and challenge a 
discourse of incumbents, but they also forced them to adopt similar rhetoric in order to 
maintain public support and appeal to other segments of population than their traditional 
electorate (Stanley, 2008, p. 96). Populism develops its own vocabulary which facilitates 
voters’ identification with political parties, and makes their message more resounding 
across various social groups. Gidron and Bonikowski, following Hawkins’ 
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conceptualization, define populism as Manichean discursive style which assigns a binary 
moral dimension to political conflicts (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, pp. 7-8). Therefore, 
for the purpose of this analysis, due to discursive properties of populism, I will discuss 
the two approaches in more detail.   
 First of all, as I stated earlier in this chapter, populism is not a full-fledged 
ideology which builds on core normative values. It does not seek to explain complicated 
social processes, neither does it seek to develop a consistent narrative. Therefore, Mudde 
and Kaltwasser propose to define populism as a “thin-centered ideology, that is an 
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic camps, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people” 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Similarly, Stanley argues that the thinness of populism 
ensures that in practice “it is a complementary ideology: it does not so much overlap 
with as diffuse itself throughout full ideologies” (Stanley, 2008, p. 107). This means that 
populism has a capability to adhere to other ideologies and influence them with a set of 
simplified, ready-made assumptions which may underlie promotion of a particular 
political action. As based on contestation, it also provides a morphology which can be 
easily assimilated into other ideologies (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 6). Populism is a 
thin concept because its ontological basis boils down to binary division between the good 
and the evil. Therefore, it encapsulates the following – the distinction between the people 
and the elite, antagonistic relations between these two groups based on the privilege of 
people to demand and exercise their sovereignty as well as positive valorization of the 
former and negative of the latter group (Stanley, 2008, p. 102).  
 The ideological distinction described above may seem quite fragile once populists 
are elected and assume public offices. This would mean that populist have become a part 
of establishment by forming an opposition towards the old elite, and thereby undermine 
their legitimacy to exercise public mandate to govern. However, as Mudde and 
Kaltwasser argue, such claim misses the point as the core distinction between the people 
and the elite is based on morality, rather than socio-political circumstances. Electoral 
victory does not mean a substantial change in anti-establishment stance of populists – it 
brings about a need to redefine the elite. They keep their anti-elitist rhetoric by focusing 
on an alleged economic leverage and international connections of the old elite which 
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enable them to exert pressure on the new government and sabotage its policies. The 
establishment is portrayed as conspiring, pursuing interests of foreign powers and trying 
to foment national crisis. Thus, populists often transform from the representatives of the 
people to protectors of the state, promoting siege mentality and claiming a right to use 
democratic mandate and extend their authority in order to resist influence of the corrupt 
elite (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 12-14).  
 Mudde and Kaltwasser list several advantages of ideational approach to populism 
presented in this chapter. First of all, its conceptual thinness allows it to permeate classical 
ideologies such as nationalism or socialism by providing a simplistic dichotomy between 
the virtuous and the villains. Second, it demonstrates the supply and the demand side of 
domestic politics – it provides a version of reality with straightforward separation of roles 
through generic, evaluative wording selection and identifies voters’ susceptibility to its 
slogans. Finally, it helps to understand a vast mobilization and support of various 
segments of population under the same postulates (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, pp. 19-
20).  
 Populism can be also defined as rhetoric or form of political discourse. Similarly, 
to ideational approach, it is based on Manichean distinction between the righteous people 
and the corrupt elite, and is juxtaposed to pluralist (diverse) and elitist (emphasizing 
intellectual superiority of the elite) vision of the world (Kocijan, 2015, p. 74). However, 
as Gidron and Bonikowski note, defining populism as discourse shifts focus from the 
underlying binary distinction in favor of gradation, i.e. measuring the degree of populism. 
The authors contend that “the degree of populism that a given actor employs may vary 
across contexts and over time, whereas the actor’s explicit ideological positions are likely 
to be more constrained by concerns over credibility” (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 9). 
Therefore, populism becomes a mode of expression which can be studied on the basis of 
its frequency/intensity, or by applying Austin’s classification of speech acts as a matrix 
for analysis.  
 Both ideational and discursive approach to populism are reconcilable as populism 
is about drawing sharp lines between what is good and bad, and needs to employ discourse 
in order to externalize dichotomous relationship between the pure people and the corrupt 
elite. Therefore, populism can be a simplistic ideational vision of the world 
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communicated to the public by means of a set of rhetorical devices easily identifiable for 
potential electorate. By combining these two approaches, it is possible to analyze how 
core ideas of a given type of populism are associated with selection of expressions and 
statements preferable to populist leaders. Furthermore, as populism have an inclusionary 
and exclusionary character, i.e. permits and denies access to the group it seeks to 
represent, it needs to generate discourse to sustain or adjust to changes within society and 
politics. As populism is a thin ideology, it does not need to be logically sound in order to 
become popular; rather, it provides simple answer to the complexity of mechanisms of 
representative democracy.    
3.2. Summary  
 
 In this chapter I have discussed variety of conceptualizations of populism and 
indicated how its use as a thin ideology by powerful actors (charismatic leaders) to shape 
common assumptions and conventions. I have outlined a twofold, textual – contextual 
model developed by Fairclough and presented Austin’s theory of speech acts as which I 
am going to use in order to investigate patterns of populist rhetoric in selected texts. 
Despite conceptual pitfalls which the phenomenon of populism presents, I have explained 
various approaches towards it, and decided for a combination of ideational – rhetorical as 
the most appropriate for further analysis. Following Fairclough’s argument that discourse 
cannot be separated from the social setting in which discursive action takes place, I am 
going to present a historical background of Jarosław Kaczyński’s activity as a key figure 
of the Porozumienie Centrum (Centre Agreement) party, and the head of Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice, also known by its abbreviation PiS) party as the 
former’s political successor.  
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4. Chapter Three – Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s solidarity-based Poland – historical 
overview, axiology and relation to thin-centered populism 
 
Having conceptualized what political discourse and populism are, I am going to 
highlight historical background and axiological characteristics of Law and Justice party 
which will help to understand elements of the relationship of ideational populism and 
populist discourse in this case. Moreover, before I proceed with textual analysis, it is 
crucial to cast more light on Jaroslaw Kaczynski himself as a prominent political figure 
who has had a significant impact on the shape of the post-1989 political life in Poland. 
This will enable to understand why Jaroslaw Kaczynski can be considered a charismatic 
populist leader whose political discourse is essential to gain understanding of ideological 
cleavages in Polish society which come up as a discursive construct in academic works 
(Bajorowicz, 2017; Gdula, 2018).  
4.1. Kaczynski’s role in the post-1989 politics in Poland 
 
 In the early 1980s, Jaroslaw Kaczynski along with his twin brother Lech, the 
president of Poland in 2005-2010, became engaged in the activity of the Solidarity 
movement as pro-democratic oppositionists. After the establishment of the so-called 
Contract Sejm as a result of the Round Table Agreement which gave momentum to the 
democratic transition of the state, Kaczynski brothers established the Centre Agreement 
(Porozumienie Centrum) party in 1990, which successfully ran in the first free 
parliamentary election in 1991, winning 8,7% of the votes (Migalski et al, 2006, p. 65). 
The party adopted a strongly Christian democratic profile and free-market orientation 
(Migalski et al, 2006, p. 39). Since the onset of the III Polish Republic, Kaczynski has 
become known for his direct criticism with regard to the post-Roundtable transition 
process which he regarded as a success of communists who escaped punishment for their 
past crimes and become incorporated into a newly-born political elite of the state process. 
Throughout his early political career in 1990s, he advocated for the idea of 
decommunization of state apparatus and called for extensive background screening of 
public officials which sometimes took a form of non-institutionalized vetting campaigns 
which launched a series of mostly unconfirmed accusations of alleged cooperation of 
high-profile politicians, representatives of judiciary, journalists and businessmen with the 
communist internal secret intelligence service (dzika lustracja). At the same time, 
38 
 
Kaczynski underscored a need for pro-European course of Polish politics and supported 
accession to NATO and prospective membership in the European Economic Community. 
After a period of remaining in a non-parliamentary opposition (1993 – 1997) and frequent 
party affiliation changes during the 4th Sejm tenure (1997-2001) Kaczynski became a co-
founder of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party, a successor party of Centre 
Agreement.  PiS was initially headed by Lech Kaczynski until 2003, when Jaroslaw took 
over the chairmanship. The new party kept its conservative character and free-market 
orientation mixed with moderate state interventionism. PiS spoke in favor of state control 
over strategic sectors of economy and promoted social equality while supporting hardline 
penal policy at the same time (Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 49-50). In 2005, the party won 
parliamentary election for the first time in history and formed a coalition government 
together with nationalist Self-Defense party and the League of Polish Families. When 
Lech Kaczynski assumed office of the President of Poland in the same year, he accepted 
the nomination of his brother for the post of Prime Minister, despite a high popularity of 
the incumbent PM Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz who had been dismissed after serving one 
year in the office. Shortly thereafter, due to an internal conflict within the coalition, the 
government headed by Jaroslaw Kaczynski collapsed in 2007 and the party suffered a 
defeat from the opposition Civic Platform party in the subsequent parliamentary election. 
Following the death of president Lech Kaczyński in the Smolensk airplane crash in 2010, 
Jaroslaw ran in the early presidential election finishing second and conceding defeat to 
the candidate fielded by the ruling Civic Platform - Bronisław Komorowski. However, 
2015 marked two electoral victories for the Law and Justice party headed by Kaczynski 
– party’s candidate Andrzej Duda won the presidential campaign, followed by the party 
winning an overall majority in the Polish parliamentary in October, for the first time in 
the history of post-1989 Poland.  
 Jaroslaw Kaczynski has been present in the politics of the Third Polish Republic 
since its very beginning. He has remained an active politician for 29 years now, performed 
duties of the party chairman since 2003 and served as Prime Minister in 2006-2007. 
Moreover, even though he did not assume any government office after 2015, he is viewed 
as the main figure influencing the shape of country’s internal and external policies (Foy, 
2016). His strong position within Law and Justice party is stipulated by the party’s charter 
granting the chairman with supreme executive power, coupled with the authority to 
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propose lists of candidates for the elections at county, parliamentary, presidential and 
European level, chair the meetings of the PiS Political Council, which is a supreme 
resolution-passing body,  convene party’s Congress and Political Council as well as chair 
and supervise the work of party’s Political Committee tasked with representing PiS 
externally (PiS Charter, 2016, pp. 11-15). Therefore, Kaczynski as a party leader has a 
decisive say in both legislative and executive issues of the party.  Furthermore, a top-
down hierarchy and centralization of power feed into the dominance of central party 
decision-making bodies over its local branches. As political decisions are adopted in the 
form of resolutions, central authorities of PiS limit independence of local party structures 
by claiming a right to repeal decisions which do not fall in line with leadership’s 
expectations or interests. Local structures are tasked with coordination of electoral 
campaigns and socio-political actions on various administrative levels while conforming 
with the party stance regarding implementation of policies which are determined by party 
headquarters (Habuda, 2010, p. 68). For instance, art. 22, para 8 of the party charter allows 
regional councils on the level of voivodeship (województwo – the highest administrative 
unit in Poland), which are regional representative bodies of the party, to discuss issues 
raised by local authorities but does not empower them to issue binding decisions in this 
respect (PiS Charter, 2016). Kaczynski himself admits that we organized the party in this 
way in order to prevent it from disintegration. In order to prevent it from an external 
pressure. We are not embedded in the state apparatus, in the establishment, in media. We 
need to defend ourselves (Habuda, 2010, p. 68). This statement is particularly interesting 
in terms of discourse employed by Kaczynski, the axiological premises of which will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
4.2. Axiology of Kaczynski’s Law and Justice party 
 
 As Migalski et al. argue, PiS is ideologically a conservative, Christian democratic 
party which emphasizes the role of Western Catholicism and its teachings in shaping 
modern Polish democratic society. It favors a model of democracy based upon a state-
enforced social solidarity while rejecting economic and moral liberal dogmatism 
(Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 49-50). It acknowledges the need to complete democratic 
transition through a major systemic overhaul, denial of access to the public offices for 
people linked with communist authorities, and strengthening of social justice under state 
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tutelage. Moreover, it emphasizes an active role of the state in the fight against corruption, 
organized crime and systemic pathologies.  
 Such vision of state as a supreme good, repository of moral values and guarantor 
of social justice is best manifested in Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s definition of raison d’état. In 
his article Polish raison d’état, Law and Justice party chairman calls for political re-
instatement of the concept at hand, understood as a set of values which would constitute 
a normative basis for policy standards followed by Polish authorities, as a non-disputable 
guidebook for political decision-makers. He contends that unitary nation state is an 
irreplaceable form of popular sovereignty which provides a framework for the most 
effective use of national resources and accomplishment of national interests in relations 
with other states. The state is a supreme form of social organization as it creates and 
executes the rules according to which democratic civic society can operate (Kaczyński, 
2010, p. 27). Next, Kaczynski focuses on multi-dimensional security as another aspect of 
Polish raison d’état. The author introduces a distinction between external and internal 
security. He argues that a properly developed armed forces and system of alliances are 
an absolute imperative for countering external threat. In such system, the primacy is given 
to hard security, i.e. military security combined with a state control over strategic 
resources and their diversification. Moreover, Kaczynski supports an active diplomatic 
engagement in shaping foreign policy of the EU towards Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus 
(Kaczyński, 2010, p. 30). In terms of internal security, Kaczynski builds his narrative 
upon an assumption that Polish politics is a subject of foreign influences, featuring a high 
degree of external controllability in variety of fields (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 31), and calls 
for change of ownership in media outlets as well as a shift in attitude of the elites towards 
raising social awareness about this problem (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 31). Kaczynski often 
refers to Germany and its economic dominance as posing a risk to implementation of his 
concept of raison d’etat, and criticizes current elite for what he regards as institutionalized 
clientelism of Poland towards Germany. Financial support of educational projects in 
Poland through German foundations or German ownership claims with regard to pre-war 
estates located on the territories which were incorporated to post-1945 Poland, are viewed 
by him, though not openly admitted, as a foreign interference and breach of state’s 
sovereignty (Kaczyński, 2010, pp. 25, 31-32). Therefore, he regards sovereignty and 
international recognition of an appropriate international status as two another crucial 
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dimensions of Polish raison d’etat. Although Kaczynski devotes a separate paragraph to 
these issues, they go hand in hand with the earlier notion of security. The author argues 
for rejection of what he calls image of Poland as a small nation which, as he contends, is 
present in Polish political thought and widespread in other countries, and supports the 
idea of delegating some authorities to the EU level as long as member states can benefit 
from the accomplishment of certain tasks (Kaczyński, 2010, pp. 32-33). Kaczynski 
contends that the EU, as a community of sovereign states, should grant its citizens more 
influence with regard to decision-making processes while respecting their national, 
cultural and moral distinctiveness. It is interesting how such distinctiveness becomes a 
basis for Kaczynski’s denial of adoption of these union laws which he labels as foreign 
and incongruent with our tradition of legal regulations and practices (Kaczyński, 2010, 
p. 33). Therefore, he views nation as an entity with some predominant form of morality 
which applies to all its members and makes it distinct from other nations and their moral 
codes. Furthermore, such distinctiveness has its historical foundations and becomes 
politicized by Kaczynski in the form of politics of memory constituting a fifth pillar of 
his concept of raison d’etat. The author posits that today Poland is a witness of decades-
long foreign campaigns of vilification. They inflict a great deal of harm to our state, 
nation and every citizen; unfortunately, they also have an impact on the attitude of some 
opinion-making circles. It is the task of numerous public institutions and Polish 
intelligentsia to counter this situation in a well thought-over and organized way 
(Kaczyński, 2010, pp. 33-34). The head of Law and Justice party proposes a type of 
politics of memory of a dual, defensive and offensive character as a remedy for such state 
of affairs. The former corresponds with his call for domestic institutional engagement in 
raising awareness about national history through education while the latter refers to 
promotion of Polish history and national achievements abroad. All in all, these elements 
of raison d’etat constitute a minimum upon which a consensus over national interests can 
be built (Kaczyński, 2010, p. 34).  
4.3. Populism of Kaczynski’s Law and Justice party – core elements 
 
    Keeping in mind the axiological characteristics of Law and Justice party described 
in the previous section, it is important to demonstrate how its elements correlate with the 
notion of populism. In order to understand it, a brief historical background of current 
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political scene in Poland should be explained. As Maciej Gdula points out (Gdula, 2018, 
pp. 14-15), post-1989 Polish politics was marked with a lack of viable alternative for 
neoliberal economic course introduced by Balcerowicz in 1990. At the beginning of 
2000s, a coalition government dominated by Alliance of Democratic Left made a series 
of surprising reforms, given its ideologically left-wing orientation, by de-regulating labor 
law, introducing controversial civil contracts (or fee-for-task agreements) which 
contributed to job insecurity of workers, cutting down state subsidies to small enterprises, 
and shutting down alimony fund for single mothers. These changes accounted for a 
skyrocketing unemployment coupled with growing economic disparity in Poland As a 
result of economic hardship, new center and right-wing parties like Civic Platform and 
Law and Justice gained much popularity among voters. What is interesting, however, they 
capitalized on public disapproval for economic policies of the left rather than divergent 
approach towards ideology or lifestyle issues. Gdula contends (Gdula, 2018, p. 17) that 
2005 marks a significant change in this picture since the current binary opposition 
between two dominant ideational narratives about preferable model of the state derives 
its origins from the presidential race which took place at that time. During his campaign, 
Lech Kaczynski, Law and Justice party candidate, used slogans referring to the 
juxtaposition of two concepts of Poland – solidarity-based and liberal, the latter embodied 
by his then-opponent Donald Tusk, head of liberal Civic Platform party. It is then that the 
political discourse of PiS has become centered around a number of key issues – social 
justice, elite change, and rejection of otherness exemplified by a negative attitude towards 
sexual minorities. However, after conservatives secured a double electoral victory in 2005 
parliamentary and presidential elections, the ruling coalition spearheaded by Law and 
Justice party did not reverse changes made by previous government, but caused much 
public uproar by its heavy-handed style of ruling and use of force to put down strikes 
staged by labor unions (so called białe miasteczko – the white town strike) (Gdula, 2018, 
pp. 17-18). Moreover, picking nationalist Self-Defense party and the League of Polish 
Families as its coalition partners, dismissal of Marcinkiewicz, and tense relationships 
inside the coalition brought about a substantial decline in party’s popularity among voters 
(Public Opinion Research Center CBOS, 2011, pp. 2-3). This led to the collapse of 
government in 2007, and early parliamentary elections.  
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 Throughout the eight-year period of ruling coalition created by Civic Platform and 
Polish People’s Party in office (2007 – 2015), Kaczynski’s party, as the leading 
opposition force in the Sejm, has become known for its vocal criticism of liberal course 
adopted by incumbents, and a consistent social rhetoric encapsulated in their concept of 
solidarity-based state. According to Antoszewski (Antoszewski, 2011, pp. 86-88), early 
elections in 2007 deepened a polarization of Polish political system into two competing 
camps as many voters became mobilized by Civic Platform to cast their ballots against 
PiS rather than in favor of any consolidated ideological message countering Law and 
Justice’s rhetoric. Moreover, a fairly good electoral result by PiS coupled with a leverage 
provided by presidential right to veto bills proposed by the ruling coalition which the 
latter was unable to override (this required garnering 3/5 of total parliamentary votes) 
enabled Kaczynski’s party to secure a position of the major critic of government.  
Therefore, Law and Justice party preserved its ability to delineate ideological axis of 
political debate in Poland for the next two tenures. In the view of bipartisan hegemony 
(both Civic Platform and PiS won 81,52% of total seats in 2007), the latter did not have 
a strong competitor which would dethrone it as a leader of parliamentary opposition.  
 Along with the imposition of binary distinction between liberal and solidarity-
based Poland, PiS managed to take over some of political postulates traditionally 
associated with the left. Kaczynski’s party attracted conservative voters with its 
dedication to Christian values and traditional model of family, while appealing to those 
with left-wing orientation by emphasizing a need for state interventionism and criticizing 
unconstrained privatization of public property. This ideological fixedness of PiS 
throughout its term allowed it to reach beyond its traditional electorate and attract voters 
of smaller parties (Antoszewski, 2011, p. 89).  
 The Smolensk airplane crash and death of president Lech Kaczynski is regarded 
by some scholars to be of immense importance for the post-2010 political identity and 
discourse of Law and Justice party. This deadly accident which killed 96 representatives 
of Polish authorities, heads of public institutions and notable figures of anti-communist 
opposition who were on the way to the commemoration ceremony of the victims of 1941 
Katyn massacre, led to early presidential election in which Jaroslaw Kaczynski was 
narrowly beaten by Bronisław Komorowski, fielded by the ruling Civic Platform. The 
Smolensk airplane crash, popularly known as Smolensk tragedy, became widely used by 
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PiS chairman to ignite public dispute on causes of the airplane crash. As Arkadiusz Nyzio 
points out (Nyzio, 2016, p. 413), the approach towards official investigation conducted 
by a group of experts established by the ruling coalition led to the formation of two 
opposing narratives – a deliberate assassination plotted by Polish government along with 
Russian authorities (favored by Kaczynski and PiS), or pilot error (supported by Civic 
Platform). Ever since the Smolensk crash, it has become a vital part of the political 
discourse of Law and Justice party and is best manifested in its concept of morality and 
truth, and elite change imperative which will be explained in next chapters.  
4.4. Euroscepticism of PiS  
 
 As I argued in the previous chapter, Euroscepticism is another important 
component of modern populism. However, Eurosceptic stance of Jaroslaw Kaczynski and 
the Law and Justice party is an interesting phenomenon given their unequivocal support 
for NATO’s strong presence in Europe (including establishing permanent military bases 
in Poland). Since the very beginning, PiS took a quite ambiguous approach towards 
Poland’s prospective membership in the EU as Kaczynski has always been a proponent 
of a strong unitary state aspiring to the role of regional political and economic leader. In 
early 2000s, a dominant narrative of the party focused on communicating an oblique 
message regarding country’s membership in the EU, and giving primacy to the rhetoric 
of nation as a sovereign, i.e. appealing to the right of nation to determine its future and 
respect its choice. Probably the most direct statement of the PiS chairman read as follows: 
“I would vote in favor of the accession, but, as a politician, I would comply with a different 
decision of the nation in this matter. I would vote against, if Poland was supposed to be 
a second-class member state” (Migalski et al, 2006, p. 112). Moreover, Kaczynski spoke 
in favor of conducting a comprehensive research, weighing pros and cons against his 
vision of a sovereign and unitary state, as a precondition for putting this matter to the 
vote. A project of Constitution for Europe which was being consulted only few months 
after Poland had joined the EU was met with a strong domestic opposition of PiS when 
Kaczynski considered it as an attempt to impose political and economic hegemony of old 
union members upon Eastern European states and declared that Poles have a right to feel 
deceived. Since then, Law and Justice party has begun advocating for acknowledging a 
supremacy of domestic law over the EU one, and inviolability of foreign and economic 
45 
 
policy of Poland as the right to pursue national interests (Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 112-
113).  
 Kaczynski perceives European integration as an attempt to form a common 
European identity, and ultimately – dissolution of nations. He juxtaposes it with the notion 
of community of sovereign states with solidarity as its core value. Therefore, PiS does 
not question the need to be part of the EU, but views international integration primarily 
instrumentally, as a mode of bridging the economic gap between Eastern and Western 
Europe. Such attitude stems from party’s ideological orientation and emphasis on the 
primacy of Christian values in Polish and European common political heritage over 
liberal ones (Migalski et al, 2006, pp. 114-114). Therefore, Kaczynski’s Euroscepticism 
originates to some extent from his party’s axiological footing. As an anti-federalist, he 
denounces what he sees as a hegemonic EU liberal – left consensus of European elites 
remaining in conflict with his view on Polish raison d’etat. Moreover, Kaczynski spares 
no criticism towards the mainstream EU bureaucracy and its politics which he views as 
representing hegemonic interests of Germany (Szczerbiak, 2015).  
 Law and Justice’s Euroscepticism can be also viewed as a response to the pro-
European stance of Civic Platform under Donald Tusk when he served as Prime Minister 
of Poland in 2007-2014. A wiretapping scandal that took place in Poland in June 2014, 
and seriously undermined public trust towards incumbents was used by Kaczynski in 
order to promote his claim for change of elites. As Tusk vacated the post of Prime 
Minister and assumed the office of chairman of the European Council shortly after the 
scandal broke out, Kaczyński presented him as a member of demoralized political class 
who used his premiership for the purpose of advancing his political career on the EU level 
(Kaczyński o kolejnych nagraniach..., 2015). This created an impression of general moral 
decay of liberal elites both on domestic and EU level as Tusk was presented as a political 
fugitive warmly welcomed by liberal European bureaucrats in Brussels.  
4.5. Electoral victory of 2015 – reasons behind high public support for PiS  
 
 As Critical Discourse Analysis requires contextualization of analyzed materials, 
the study of Kaczynski’s texts cannot be conducted in separation from various political 
developments which they reinforce or give rise to. Therefore, in order to understand 
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Kaczynski’s discourse, one should look at its contribution and effect on bolstering a set 
of attitudes towards socio-political problems which become a subject of public debate.  
  According to Gdula, a spectacular success of PiS in 2015 presidential and 
parliamentary elections can be attributed to several factors. First, Kaczynski’s party 
benefitted from vulgarization of public debate promoted by media outlets as a response 
to the development of alternative sources of information. In the past, as Gdula argues, a 
high structuralization of Polish political parties throughout 1990s enabled them to 
develop their narratives around opinion of key politicians – experts, who communicated 
it through mass media, which the latter validated as authoritative. Such monopoly of 
traditional press, radio and television was broken by commercial media outlets and 
internet-based news platforms. Therefore, a shift from a mere opinion-shaping function 
towards profit-oriented popularization of information as a mode of increasing viewership 
ratings was given priority. The format of political debates based on pluralist exchange of 
worldviews has been substituted by an emotional clash of antagonistic opinions aimed at 
discrediting political opponents. Nowadays, political actors prefer to build their discourse 
around key events which have an impact on popularity scores of particular parties (for 
example Smolensk airplane crash, wiretapping scandal in 2014 etc). Gdula contends 
(Gdula, 2018, pp. 29-30) that events can contribute to the formation of political discourse 
as long as political actors are able to use them discursively, i.e. create a sense of crisis 
and show readiness to tackle it. Therefore, Kaczynski’s strength stems from his ability to 
shape narrative of events in line with his rhetoric of thin-centered populism.  
 Effective identification and responsiveness to the public expectations constitute 
another important factor explaining Law and Justice’s success in 2015. Gdula explains 
this electoral victory on the basis of his concept of stratification of Polish society. The 
author builds his analytical framework upon non-dichotomous classification of social 
classes, derived partly from Bourdieu’s works, and  distinguishes three of them – people’s 
class, characterized by closeness of interpersonal relations, straightforward sociability, 
affirmation of self-esteem through affiliation with like-minded people, altruistic readiness 
to help relatives on the basis of non-reciprocity, appreciation of frugality and 
resourcefulness, and conservative, live-and-let-live tolerance; middle class, characterized 
by its propensity to value order on various levels (work-life balance, norms of social 
conduct and governance quality), and self-discipline through career planning and 
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upgrading life standards; finally, upper class as defined through its anti-collectivism and 
reservation towards social actions, individual autonomy in determining value of practices, 
and readiness to sacrifice personal life for achievement of professional objectives (Gdula, 
2018, pp. 42-44). An increase of demand for well-qualified white-collar workers which 
is a constant trend since the establishment of capitalist economy in post-1989 Poland, 
coupled with free higher education resulted in numerical growth of middle class and 
dissemination of attitudes towards career-planning, common for this part of society. 
Although the fact of belonging to the middle class does not automatically mean better 
income or living standard than in the case of people’s class, expansion of lifestyle typical 
for members of middle class as well as market demand for university graduates make it 
crucial element of Polish socio – economic  landscape (Gdula, 2018, pp. 46-49). 
Therefore, middle class represents a highly attractive target for politicians due to its share 
in labor market. Moreover, possible tensions between upper (including politicians 
themselves) and middle class, and higher economic fragility of the latter make it the most 
volatile group of voters in Poland. Market saturation caused by a large number of people 
with high education, inability to achieve economic independence due to affordable 
housing shortage and financial obligations such as long-term loans, as well as 
deregulation of labor market and growing insecurity made the members of this segment 
of society realize that their life expectations and professional ambitions cannot be 
accomplished within a relatively short period of time. This stands in a stark contrast with 
safe economic situation of representatives of upper class which contributes to the sense 
of injustice and rejection of current state of affairs. Thus, a rhetoric of crisis finds a fertile 
ground, and allows parties such as PiS to garner much support amongst members of 
middle class (Gdula, 2018, pp. 57-59).  
 Indeed, Law and Justice’s spectacular success in 2015 parliamentary election can 
be explained by looking at popularity of Kaczynski’s party across various social strata. 
During its campaign, PiS often invoked rising aspirations of Poles and presented itself as 
an advocate of long-standing political and economic change. It proposed a series of social 
benefit programs for less well-off citizens, changes to tax law (lowering tax-free amount), 
labor law (lowering retirement age), and rising minimum wage. Such left-wing policy 
was coupled with voicing respect for traditional values and patriotism on one hand, and 
populist promises of bringing power back to the people on the other. Such image of 
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comprehensive systemic overhaul in conservative packaging overcame social differences 
of lower and middle class by combining calls for elite change with responsiveness to the 
public needs (Gdula, 2018, pp. 68-69).  
 Law and Justice party’s rhetoric is particularly resounding among representatives 
of middle class since it reinforces a sense of injustice while simultaneously satisfying a 
popular desire to take back control of one’s life path from those who do not deserve to 
dictate it. Such narrative resounding among those who experienced a material deprivation 
related to the loss of job or necessity to pay off mortgage. Because they feel 
disadvantaged, they are more likely to support rhetoric based on clear juxtaposition 
between the good and the evil, even if systemic changes offered go far beyond initial 
promises. However, economic factors are not the only motivation for members of middle 
class to back PiS anti-elitist stance. Some of them focus on non-materialist values, and, 
in the context of political events such as wiretapping scandal involving representatives of 
state authorities in 2014, claim moral superiority over compromised officials and 
politicians (Gdula, 2018, pp. 72-76).  Therefore, Kaczynski’s discourse mobilized the 
people to reclaim their state from incompetent/immoral elite and addresses their 
ambitions.  
4.6. Summary  
 
In this chapter, I have focused on outlining key features of Kaczynski’s Law and 
Justice party ideological profile and summarized briefly its historical record on Polish 
political scene. First, I sketched a short biography of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and 
underscored his importance as a party leader vested with broad executive and legislative 
authority. Next, I moved to explain Law and Justice party’s axiology heavily shaped by 
Kaczynski’s understanding of raison d’état and highlighted core elements of party’s 
populism manifested in its ideology and political discourse. I paid a special attention to 
its ability to impose the binary distinction between a solidarity-based and liberal model 
of the state as a main axis of political debate in Poland. Moreover, I demonstrated a thin 
character of its populism which to a large extent follows Mudde and Kaltwasser’s 
proposal, and its use as a discursive tool in domestic and foreign policy. Finally, I 
explained its high popularity across social strata as an effect of the universality of its 
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discourse and ability to address fears and hardship of Polish citizens and succeed in 
delivering a message centered around restoration of dignity and sovereignty.  
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5. Chapter Four – Operationalization of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s political discourse 
 
In previous chapters, I have provided a comprehensive conceptual framework for 
the analysis of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s speeches and explained historical, social and 
economic circumstances which contributed to its effectiveness in terms of garnering 
public support for PiS program and securing a double electoral victory by this party in 
2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. Although some elements of Kaczynski’s 
discourse have already been outlined especially in relation to the concept of populism, 
they constitute a starting point for a broader study of selected texts which help to navigate 
through the nuances of a more complex reality presented by Kaczynski in different 
contexts and on different occasions. For the purpose of this MA thesis, I have selected 
five speeches:  
- Electoral victory speech delivered on 25th of October 2015,  
- Speech delivered on 10th April 2016 at the rally commemorating 6th anniversary 
of the Smolensk airplane crash,  
- National Flag Day speech delivered in the Sejm on 2nd May 2016,  
- Independence Day speech delivered on 11th November 2016,  
- Speech delivered on 1st July 2017 at the 5th Party Congress  
All selected speeches were given on various occasions. The first speech has a 
laudatory character, as it was delivered shortly after the official announcement of 
parliamentary electoral results which gave Law and Justice party an overall majority of 
seats in the Sejm and Senate, as the first party in the history of Polish post-communist 
parliamentarism. In the second speech, Kaczynski addresses a group of party supporters 
gathered in front of Presidential Palace in Warsaw, which had seen spontaneous 
gatherings after the Smolensk airplane crash in 2010 when Poles turned out en masse to 
pay tribute to the victims; these gatherings had been transformed into political rallies by 
PiS and used regularly for political agitation in the following years. The third speech was 
delivered to the members of parliament and veterans of communist-era opposition 
movements during party celebrations of official national holiday. The fourth speech was 
delivered at the PiS party celebrations of the Independence Day. Finally, in the last speech 
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Kaczynski addressed representative of central and local party authorities at the agenda-
setting party congress in the town of Przysucha. 
As one can see, selected speeches vary according to the context in which they 
were delivered. Considering that Kaczynski addresses an audience consisting of party 
supporters (first and second case) or party members (third, fourth and fifth speech), some 
of them have a predominantly laudatory (electoral victory speech), celebratory and 
moralistic (speeches delivered on the occasion of national holidays) or nearly 
commemorative character (the Smolensk crash). However, all of them feature common 
elements of the same political discourse which will be analyzed in the subsequent 
sections.  
 At this point, I am going to analyze core concepts which appear in selected texts. 
This will help to understand whether it is possible to identify cohesive and consistent 
discursive patterns in Kaczynski’s speeches.  
5.1. Morality, memory and truth 
 
 The concept of morality appears in Kaczynski’s speeches in various contexts, and 
can be regarded as fundamental to the development of binary populist opposition between 
the people and the elite. It is formulated in close relationship with three other notions – 
responsibility, memory and truth, which pertain to the quality of state as a producer and 
supplier of goods and services as well as its legislature where it is manifested in the 
activity of public institutions. Therefore, morality plays an important role in those 
speeches, where it is contextually required, i.e. commemorative and celebratory ones.  
 Kaczynski sets out his understanding of morality in three out of five selected texts, 
the most comprehensive of which is presented in the 10th April 2016 speech at the rally 
commemorating the Smolensk crash. 
Example 1:  
 They wanted to kill our memory. They wanted to kill it, because they feared it. 
Because someone is responsible for this tragedy, at least morally, no matter what were 
the causes of it. And this responsibility lies with the previous government […] And they 
did everything, breaking the rules in every possible manner, to make this memory perish. 
But their actions were unsuccessful, unsuccessful from the beginning. This memory lasted 
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already on the first days. The first memorials appeared, commemorations took place, 
independent press and independent media covered this topic.  
This fragment contains several interesting features of the interplay between 
morality, memory and truth. Kaczynski views memory as a carrier of identity and uses 
possessive determiner our in order to indicate that it constitutes a collective good. As the 
government is presented as manipulating it, it is judged primarily on moral premises of 
its political action. Moreover, memory, or rather commemoration as its manifestation, 
becomes a general moral imperative which overshadows the establishment of real facts 
(someone is responsible… no matter what were the causes); the readiness to advocate for 
memory and voice opposition towards de facto manipulative actions of previous 
government enables PiS chairman to legitimize its rhetoric as a proponent of memory and 
pursuit of truth. Kaczynski seeks to monopolize a uniform (our) understanding of 
memory by claiming the right to interpret and represent moral standards of the collectivity 
while rejecting possible argumentations which do not encompass moral dimension of 
memory.  
By announcing a failure of manipulative actions of the government, Kaczynski 
puts much emphasis on the expressive value of manifestations of memory which allows 
it to be acknowledged in public. At the same time, his utterances have verdictive features, 
i.e. enable him to make judgements with regard to the government treatment of the 
memory as well as subjective assessment of its consequences (successful – unsuccessful) 
based on exposure of memory to the public. He ascribes a particular importance to 
uniform media coverage and public presence of memorials in uncovering systemic 
transparency deficit which the elite seeks to preserve in order to preclude the people from 
gaining access to the truth:  
Example 2:  
 The [new – author’s note] names of streets, squares, roundabouts are needed, we 
must execute a proper commemoration of those who died, among whom there were many 
remarkable people. We must do it against Polish establishment, against those, who claim 
to have right to control both Poland and Polish memory. They shall not win! We must 
win!  
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Therefore, memory is validated once it becomes tangible, i.e. present in the public 
space. Kaczynski creates an impression of a moral conflict between the establishment and 
righteous people which rests on dichotomy of values. The people’s wish to pay tribute to 
notable representatives of the nation who died serving their country is viewed as an 
indisputable imperative which should be free from political consideration because it is a 
common moral imperative of the Polish nation. However, as it cannot be executed due to 
objections on the part of the elite, their mandate to represent the people should be revoked 
since they fail to follow nations expectations.  
Moral imperative is expressed in this part of the text by the modal verb must which 
stands for undertaking a collective effort vis-à-vis an organized opposition to challenge 
the unacceptable status quo. The establishment is interpellated into the role of villain who 
does not allow to exercise public will to pay tribute to deceased important figures of the 
elite which stands in opposition to generally accepted form of commemoration. 
Therefore, by categorizing such situation as conflict between two attitudes of which one 
can only prevail (they cannot win, we must win), Kaczynski performs a perlocutionary act 
as his utterances aim at persuading the public to take action in favor of change exemplified 
by disruption of status quo as well as de-legitimization of the establishment. 
In Kaczynski’s understanding, if memory is a common good, it needs to be a made 
publicly available as well. Therefore, it is the role of the state to make it known to 
everyone:  
Example 3:  
This truth can be defined as public truth, state truth, truth in textbooks, truth in 
books, truth in media, in the generally available media, truth in the awareness of Poles, 
as millions of Poles, including the righteous ones, do not know what happened, do not 
understand it all. We must explain it to them. We must use the possibilities we have today 
in order to make Poles realize and understand it. Today, as the research shows, almost 
25% of young people cannot answer the question – Who is responsible for the Katyn 
massacre? Today, we cannot let it happen in the case of Smolensk [crash – author’s note].  
 Here, the concept of truth is in a way blended with memory as Kaczynski presents 
lack of awareness about historical events (with its assessment of who is responsible for 
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the Katyn massacre rather than who committed it). As the truth becomes another moral 
value, the role of the state is to preserve it through institutionalization. The omnipresence 
of truth, as postulated by Kaczynski, comes along with implementation of certain policies 
in the field of education, media and culture, which are designed to raise public awareness. 
Moreover, once again Kaczynski draws a line between us, who know the truth, or rather 
seek its validation by the state, and them, i.e. those segments of society who do not 
possess/know it yet, but the quality of being righteous renders them eligible to be 
informed about it. It is a reflection of an essential presupposition embraced by the 
populists – a hostility between the people and the establishment who try to manipulate 
unaware segments of population. Therefore, the author invalidates other narratives which 
emerge in response to the Smolensk crash by repealing them as a sort of misconception 
inculcated by the establishment on people whose desire is to find out what happened but 
do not possess means to do it. Furthermore, Kaczynski compares the level of current 
historical knowledge about Katyn within a certain segment of population with the 
awareness about what tragic event of Smolensk catastrophe, which implies that it is may 
be effect of purposeful policy by the elite/former government (just as it was in the case 
of communist regime concealing the truth about Soviet responsibility for massacre of 
Polish officers in Katyn which would jeopardize ideological relationships with the 
USSR). Therefore, such measure is designed to undermine the legitimacy of 
establishment as those who implement a strategy of whitewashing crimes, just as 
communist-era leadership did in the case of Katyn massacre on one hand, and depict 
previous government as complicit in the death of the real elite headed by president Lech 
Kaczynski on the other. Therefore, the data on young people’s awareness of historical 
events invoked by Kaczynski is meant to corroborate his claim that raising awareness 
about the truth falls into competencies of the state and contrast it with possible effects of 
what he sees as manipulation in the case of Smolensk airplane crash. 
 A frequent repetition of the noun truth bears certain degree of illocutionary force 
as its use informs and assures the public of what is the desirable state of affairs with regard 
to the preservation of memory and identity. When Kaczynski speaks about explaining the 
truth to a group of unaware citizens, he does not advocate for any clear mode of action; 
rather, he makes a statement of commitment to the cause and presents the scope of the 
problem as the idea of omnipresence of truth presupposes a high deficit thereof. Thus, 
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Kaczynski signalizes that by assuming state power, PiS is entitled to make far-reaching 
changes in the public domain.  
 As state constitutes a supreme moral value which should reflect a dominant 
national morality based on pursuit of truth and preservation of collective memory, it 
assumes a regulatory function in order to recognize these values and implement them 
through policies it produces. Kaczynski sets out such vision in the speech delivered during 
Independence Day celebrations on 11 November 2016:  
Example 4:   
 The white-red flag is a symbol of our state, a symbol stipulated in the constitution. 
Symbols are meant to build unity, to create unity. But simultaneously symbols are meant 
to remind, to make aware that there is a direct relationship between public sphere/state 
sphere, and sphere of values. A fundamental truth is at stake. Not only is the state an 
organization covering certain territory; the state should constitute a moral quality. We 
have talked about it for over 20 years. I wish to repeat it now once again. This moral 
quality, to put it somehow differently, means a legitimacy of the state.  
 In this fragment, Kaczynski puts an emphasis on the quality of state, but also refers 
indirectly to the role of memory when he invokes national symbols as its carriers. Since 
symbols are viewed as unifying all citizens, they stand for a uniform set of values 
represented by the state and its institutions which authorize them. Moreover, as the state 
authority should reach far beyond regulatory functions and assume moral position, it 
sanctions certain modes of behavior or attitudes and bans others. As long as the stance of 
the state externalized in normative acts matches with morality of the people, it can be 
called legitimate.  
 In terms of textual properties, the author uses syntactic parallelism in order to 
underscore theme and context of his speech, as visible in its original version. Repetition 
of the noun symbol draws attention to the variety of purposes they can be applied for, 
though their role does not constitute the focal point of Kaczynski’s argumentation. The 
main axis of argument is concentrated around the relationship of state and quality-setting 
values, though the author uses only expositive speech act (he wishes to repeat what the 
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party have highlighted for years) when he attempts to reassert Law and Justice’s linear 
continuity of thought throughout years of its existence.  
As Kaczynski argues, although PiS have firmly supported a value-centric concept 
of state, moral deficiencies have not been filled. Therefore, in the following part of the 
speech, he develops a three-fold concept of state legitimacy:  
Example 5:  
We can talk about two types of legitimacy, except the one which is very important 
to democracy and which, by no means, I intend to ignore, namely formal legitimacy, i.e. 
the legitimacy which stems from electoral regulations, law-making regulations, from all 
this what is the most crucial to democracy and which we do not dispute. But there are 
legitimacies which are deeper, so to say. We can talk about two such legitimacies. The 
first one is of historical – moral character. It pertains to the history, tradition, language, 
culture codes, common understanding and understanding of meaning. This legitimacy is 
extremely important as it is linked to social awareness; but in the case of Poland, Polish 
tradition, it pertains to some clearly stated postulates. These postulates are – freedom, 
equality and justice.  
 The second type of legitimacy, which may be called a pragmatic one, concerns all 
these things which the state is supposed to provide. In other words, it means everything 
what the state does in order to satisfy the needs of citizens and of the community. These 
issues can be described in various ways but I believe that the most appropriate, the most 
accurate would be to discuss them in relation to a broadly taken security. The history of 
states, the history of their formation as a sort of political phenomenon demonstrates this 
best. Today, as far as modern form of the state is concerned, such legitimacy has 5 
dimensions: internal, external, social security of the modern state, economic turnover 
security, or economic security in modern understanding, and finally a peculiar type of 
the security of the self which the state ought to ensure for its citizens. The state is, after 
all, entitled to use coercion, but it is also a supplier of goods.  
 Apart from democratic mandate based on procedural principles, Kaczynski lists 
two other legitimacies: historical – moral and pragmatic as indispensable for modern 
state. In the first case, legitimacy is externalized though manifestations of freedom to and 
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equality in expressing cultural and national affiliation. This means that nursing public 
awareness of national historical legacy and culture becomes a moral imperative of a state. 
As morality is a quality of the state in Kaczynski’s terms, the state may also act 
immorally, and thus illegitimately, as long as its actions, or inaction, do not lead to 
dissemination, or rather imposition of truth aimed at increasing social identification with 
it. Therefore, history becomes a subject of moral judgement under state tutelage and 
constitutes a determinant of present state of public awareness based on the historical – 
moral continuity carried by various state-sanctioned manifestations of memory in public 
space. Tradition, on the other hand, provides a set of indisputable values which serve as 
a benchmark for such moral judgements.  
 Pragmatic legitimacy pertains to the role of the state as a producer and supplier of 
goods which ensure existential security of its citizens. Such state model functions 
somehow in separation from the citizens themselves – once the state is legitimized, it 
performs its duties according to the moral principles of solidarity, freedom and equality, 
which, however, cannot be accomplished without yielding primacy to the security-first 
tenet. Kaczynski posits that social life in Poland is driven by some urgent need for security 
due to its historical record of suffering from devastating wars and long periods of 
externally imposed dependence, and places past experiences in the context of current 
political developments. Along with classical understanding of hard security coupled with 
soft dimensions of security such as economy and social security, Kaczynski lists an 
obscure category of state security of the self. Although such understanding is not 
extensively elaborated in the text, a sense of tradition-based moral distinctiveness of the 
nation championed by Kaczynski is closest to the concept of ontological security 
proposed by Jennifer Mitzen. As the author argues, nations define their distinctiveness in 
relation to other nations which allows them to develop and preserve identity coherence; 
similarly, states seek to routinize their relations with other states in order to provide 
citizens with a sense of ontological security, i.e. preserve self-identity. States project self-
images which are meant to bind their citizens together and solidify a nation-state-centric 
self-definition of their inhabitants (Mitzen, 2006, p. 352). Therefore, any shift in social 
identity brought about by the influx of foreign values and ideas can be perceived as an 
attack on identity and generate a sense of uncertainty. As far as Kaczynski’s take on 
security is concerned, the confrontation between solidarity-based and liberal Poland has 
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many features of a battle for ontological security, especially when it comes to divergent 
attitudes towards desired status of Poland in the EU. Therefore, the security of the self 
pertains to measures of reassertion of national – ideological identity consolidated vis-à-
vis some common enemy. 
 Textual analysis of the cited fragment allows for indicating several important 
points about construction of the text. First, what stands out is Kaczynski’s care of local 
textual cohesiveness of his typology of legitimizations. The author draws a clear 
distinction between a more conventional type of legitimacy related to democratic 
character of the regime, and two types of legitimacy that remain at the center of his 
argumentation. Although conceptualizations of historical – moral legitimacy and 
legitimacy of the state-as-a-provider or state-as-a-producer are clearly stated and 
exemplified, Kaczynski does not offer much insight into measurement of the legitimacy, 
leaning towards general dichotomous distinction between presence and absence thereof. 
However, as these legitimacies are deeper than purely democratic one, as he puts it, he 
primarily focuses on describing his typology while largely neglecting clarification of their 
relationship with democracy itself. Instead, he presents the two legitimacies as all-
encompassing, stretching his concept to include numerous aspects of social life which 
seem to be closer to the people, such as security, freedom, sense of equality and justice. 
Therefore, the analyzed fragment does not feature an extensive use of illocutionary acts, 
except expositives enabling Kaczynski to justify prioritization of his typology over 
conventional alternative and develop his (and his party’s) argumentation accordingly (we 
intend not to ignore democracy, we do not dispute democracy, but I believe security is 
the most important aspect of legitimacy of the state-as-a-provider).  
5.2. Core values  
 
 Kaczynski’s discourse of solidarity-based Poland which emerges in the response 
to the spread of liberal values in Polish politics and society, relies heavily on three 
components - freedom, equality and justice through solidarity. This multi-faceted model 
is manifested best in two speeches delivered during celebrations of the official state 
holidays of 2nd May 2016 (the State Flag Day) and 11th November 2016 (Independence 
Day) as well as at the electoral victory speech of 25th October 2015. All of them are deeply 
embedded in the previously discussed understandings of the paramount role of Polish 
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state in strengthening moral values in the society and promoting a peculiar type of morally 
binding truth, and fit into the scheme of thin populism represented by Kaczynski. They 
constitute a set of core values which can be viewed as a reflection of desired public status 
of peculiar type of truth advocated for by Law and Justice party chairman as well as 
manifestation of moral duties of the state. Moreover, they contribute to the populist image 
of Kaczynski himself as they fall in line with the socio–political antagonism between the 
people and the establishment.  
 Just as in the case of morality discussed in previous section, Kaczynski discusses 
the problem of freedom from the historical perspective. It becomes a central issue in the 
struggle to exercise the right for self-determination:  
Example 6:   
[We have drawn conclusions from– author’s note] 100 years, when Poland had been 
established, lived as an independent state, lost this independence, had been subjugated 
by the murderous Hitler’s regime, German regime, Soviet regime, communism came next 
and finally came freedom…. freedom that we must protect. We must protect it because 
freedom and independence is not given forever. This is the task, this is the challenge we 
must be constantly reminded of. Our celebration is a celebration of memory, but it has to 
be a kind of active memory, such memory that translates into current actions, a memory 
from which we draw motivation, wisdom, experience for our future actions.  
The most striking point of this fragment of Kaczynski’s Independence Day 
speech is the image of Poland as an organic entity which lives, can be stripped of its 
independence but eventually is able to regain it. Therefore, as the state is presented as a 
uniform entity, the author does not address personal liberties which may translate into a 
sense of general freedom of citizens. Although Poland was established, it somehow 
existed independently, lived its life until it has been subjected to systemic annihilation. 
Kaczynski depicts Poland as an organism which had been denied its freedom to develop 
by more powerful foreign systems which, however, did not manage to wipe it out despite 
continuous efforts to do so. Interestingly, the author uses adjectives Nazi and German 
together, which gives an impression of continuity of historical guilt by emphasizing 
German origins of Nazi totalitarianism which deserve condemnation even today. This is 
particularly important in the context of combined Euroscepticism and anti-German 
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sentiments vis-à-vis a desired status of Poland in international politics, which will be 
discussed in next section.  
As freedom is considered to be volatile and cannot be taken for granted, 
Kaczynski translates past experiences into current sense of insecurity encapsulated in the 
conflict between the people and the elite as a common feature of all selected speeches. 
Denial of freedom is re-contextualized and employed as a bugbear in case we (the people) 
do not actively oppose those who wish to suppress our memory. Kaczynski, in response 
to such threat, sees politicization of memory and victimization as essential instruments of 
executing Polish raison d’etat both internally and externally. As traumatizing events 
provide a moral justification for rejection of foreign values which may turn out to conceal 
their totalitarian character, the people must be mobilized in order to preserve 
distinctiveness and sovereignty.  
This part of Kaczynski’s speech is characterized by an extensive use of syntactic 
parallelism, which is also employed to a lesser degree than in the Example 4. Frequent 
in-text repetitions coupled with the use of the same words at the end of preceding and at 
the beginning of following sentences are used in order to intensify the message and 
present issues at hand as urgent. Moreover, the use of commissives in the form of 
declaration of obligation (we must protect…, we must be constantly reminded of…...) 
attributes the form of speech presented by Example 4 with a relatively high illocutionary 
force in addition to the structural properties.  
Kaczynski elaborates most extensively on the importance of core values in the 
Flag Day speech where they are discussed as a reason of conflict between two opposing 
camps – patriotic and liberal:  
Example 7: 
I think that one might say that today, what Poles expect from the state are 
security, freedom, equality and justice, which, in Poland, is always related to solidarity. 
[One might say – authors note] that these are especially important expectations. Today, 
we celebrate the Flag Day, the Constitution Day, national holiday, is tomorrow. I believe 
this is the best moment to reflect on how these issues are currently addressed in Poland. 
I will start with the issue of awareness, I will start with good news, with what is positive, 
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with something that makes us glad. The great work of patriotic circles, the great work of 
late president Lech Kaczynski has born fruits. The offensive of the pedagogics of shame, 
the offensive of all these things that were meant to put common, national values in 
jeopardy is failing. It is failing across all generations, especially in the youngest one. The 
good is distinguished from the evil, everything that has been done to blurry the boundaries 
between the two is in retreat.  
Kaczynski claims that security, freedom, equality and justice are universal 
values which are shared by Poles while, at the same time, they remain crucial elements 
of the social supply – demand equilibrium. Interestingly, the author does not proceed to 
reflect on them immediately, but focuses on state of public awareness instead. Such 
measure is applied in order to highlight the importance of social awareness as a common 
denominator for all listed values as the expectations regarding prioritization of security, 
freedom, equality or justice cannot be formulated if citizens do not realize how important 
they are. National holidays celebrations make such expectations more vocal because amid 
the aura of crisis they serve as a symbol of rebirth and time of mobilization vis-à-vis 
potential threats to common values. The crisis emerges as a result of organized action 
taking a form of pedagogics of shame which endangers core values through their 
systematic distortion by means of a fragmentary presentation of historical events 
impinging on revision of collective national memory. The term pedagogics of shame itself 
is not a novelty to political scientists – it has been analyzed by looking into the role of 
myths in shaping politics, also in Poland. As Eugeniusz Ponczek argues (Ponczek, 2017, 
pp. 42-43), pedagogics of shame can be analyzed as a part of historical – political 
discourse which arouses ambivalent feelings externalized in the form of emotional 
criticism of historical events or historical record of certain attitudes which are subjectively 
deemed as unacceptable. This may lead to questioning patriotism as a source of national 
myths and re-formulation of national – ethnic identity. Therefore, Kaczynski devotes 
much attention to social awareness as a crucial factor enabling development of alternative 
pedagogy of pride bringing together members of all generations and safeguarding core 
values from what he sees as an attack on national unity. This seems to fit into a textbook 
populist concept of the good and the evil, the moral people and the mendacious elite.   
Kaczynski creates an ideal-type of patriotic camp centered around a discursive construct 
of political legacy of late president Lech Kaczynski as a cornerstone of values which 
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opposes competing historical narratives and dismisses its negative elements. The electoral 
victory speech of 25th October 2015 gives a brief account of distinctive features of such 
approach:  
Example 8:  
10 years and 2 days ago, Lech Kaczynski was elected president of the Republic 
of Poland. I am not mentioning this solely because we are marking 10th anniversary. I am 
mentioning this because without him, the United Right would not exist now, Law and 
Justice party would exist now. Those, who opposed the establishment in Poland would 
not have any chance to succeed. He was able to prevail despite a huge media attention 
favoring his opponents and fostering popularity of their image; he managed to win 
election in Warsaw, he won general presidential election in Poland, having worked as 
the Minister of Justice what helped us to establish Law and Justice party. He created a 
political momentum which led to the establishment of the party. He showed that the spirit 
is stronger than the flesh, he demonstrated that genuineness, high professional 
competences, beautiful biography and such a deep dedication to Poland, and, above all, 
to all workers, this was something convincing to the people. We must remember of him, 
we must remember also at this moment. And when he reported to me “Mr. Chairman, the 
mission has been accomplished”, I wish to do the same today – Mr. President, the mission 
has been accomplished! 
Kaczynski introduces his deceased brother as a founder and key figure of 
political community of PiS members and its supporters, and constructs an image of a 
successful figure, which gave people incentives to stand up to political establishment. In 
this discourse, President Kaczynski is presented as a political underdog-turned-president, 
who fought his way through without putting a spin on his image and staying genuine. He 
is portrayed as a confident and goal-oriented politician who, in order to win the David-
and-Goliath battle against the establishment (including media) based his campaign on 
hard work rather than electoral marketing and publicity which helped him to succeed. He 
is at the same time a statesman and one of the crowd, exceptional in his persistence in 
pursuit of goals and ability to appeal to the people. Moreover, when Kaczynski employs 
the metaphorical antithesis of spirit and flesh, he indirectly invokes tragic circumstances 
in which the presidential tenure, depicted as a great work of his brother’s life, ended after 
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Lech Kaczynski’s death in Smolensk airplane crash in 2010. By creating a romanticized 
image of Lech Kaczynski as a wise leader of high competences and beautiful biography, 
he seeks to underline his loyalty and adherence to the values that he ascribes to his brother, 
and show continuity of his work. Furthermore, when Kaczynski announces a landslide 
electoral victory in parliamentary election of 2015, he depicts it as a fulfillment of 
president Kaczynski’s legacy and the end of certain epoch. Thus, latest electoral success 
is presented by PiS chairman as a landmark where the construct of Lech Kaczynski’s 
legacy not only remains a guidebook of patriotism-driven politics, but is also placed 
among the Pantheon of Polish statesmen and becomes a part of political rhetoric of reform 
strongly linked with the discursive offensive of morality. The figure of president 
Kaczynski combined all values underscored by his brother which add up to moral 
foundations of solidarity-based Poland – justice, thanks to his service as a Minister of 
Justice which earned him popularity and allowed to claim victory in local and 
parliamentary elections; equality since Lech Kaczynski is portrayed as a statesman 
deriving his political roots from pro-democratic mass Solidarity movement or even being 
its leading figure (hence his close relationship with the workers is emphasized in 
Kaczynski’s speech); and finally freedom, as he left a legacy which provides the people 
with moral motivation to act in defense of core values.  
There are several interesting conclusions which can be associated with laudatory 
character of the analyzed extract of this speech. As Kaczynski devotes much attention to 
his deceased brother whom he depicts as a crucial figure both for PiS and for Poland, he 
uses commissive speech act (we must remember…) in order to show dedication to the 
legacy of the president, but also claim his share in its preservation when he uses 
intertextuality as a rhetorical device to declare electoral victory the way Lech Kaczynski 
did that after the outcome of the successful presidential run was announced on 23rd 
November 2005 (Mr. Chairman – the mission has been accomplished!). This measure 
allows Jaroslaw Kaczynski to conclude the process of discursive mythization of Lech 
Kaczynski and his accomplishments (he prevailed…, he won…, he managed to…, he 
created…, he showed… etc.) as well as consolidate his programmatic thin-centered 
ideology of moral and value-driven under a kind of patron figure of the patriotic camp 
and common citizens.   
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5.3. Euroscepticism 
 
Although Kaczynski avoided stating clear position vis-à-vis Poland’s 
membership in the EU prior to the accession referendum in 2003, traces of his 
Euroscepticism can be observed by looking at the situation that ensued after ratification 
of the Treaty of Lisbon which significantly decreased country’s ability to influence 
decision-making process in the EU (Piłka, 2018). Interestingly, as the document was 
signed by president Lech Kaczynski which has become a deep crack on the image of Law 
and Justice as party presenting itself as an advocate of Polish national interests in the EU, 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski claimed later that the treaty had been ratified under time pressure in 
view of growing popularity of liberal parties in the expense of PiS and the then-incumbent 
president, which, as he believed, would not have been able to negotiate better provisions 
of the treaty (Kaczynski, 2015). At the same time, Kaczynski voiced harsh criticism 
towards the leading role of the French – German duo in shaping European politics which 
became more resounding after the outbreak of the refugee crisis in 2015 coupled with 
Merkel’s open-door immigration policy and the conflict over Nord Stream 2 pipeline 
project bypassing Poland. Despite this, Kaczynski does not neglect a positive role of 
European financial aid of which Poland has been the biggest beneficiary so far, and avoids 
the use of term Eurosceptic in regards to his party’s ideological stance. Rather, 
Kaczynski’s Euroscepticism emerges as a conflict of moral values between Poland and 
the West which is boiled down to the fight for preservation of national distinctiveness 
against a widespread proliferation of Western lifestyle as well as standards of liberal 
democracies which Kaczynski sees as incompatible with Poland’s conservative – 
Catholic cultural background. Therefore, a type of Euroscepticism that dominates in 
Kaczynski’s speeches, can be defined as soft, following Taggart and Szczerbiak’s original 
binary classification of hard – soft Euroscepticism in which, as they argue, “there is no 
principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but where concerns on 
one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the 
EU, or where there is a sense that national interest is currently at odds with the EU 
trajectory” (Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003 , p. 6). In the case of Kaczynski’s 
Euroscepticism, such opposition is based also on the moral premises regarding promotion 
of state interests and state values which he views as irreconcilable with certain EU 
policies.   
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Although Kaczynski does not advocate for any form of hard dissociation with 
the EU, he actually depicts it as a distant foreign body, a sort of decision-making center 
consolidated by economic hegemons which seek to pursue their interests and colonizing 
smaller states politically and economically. Therefore, the fact that throughout his 
discourse Kaczynski puts a particular emphasis on a broadly understood security ensured 
through the membership in NATO and the EU seems quite paradoxical; although 
Kaczynski criticizes Germany as a prominent agent of prioritizing hegemonic interests of 
the few at the expense new member states which joined the EU in 2004 and later, he does 
not deny a positive role of economic support of the EU which is predominantly financed 
by the members of the old union,  including Germany is the main net contributor 
(Rothwell, 2016). Rather, he prefers to present Polish membership in the EU and 
possibility to gain financial benefits from it as a demonstration of long-awaited historical 
justice and compensation for what is still viewed by many Poles as Western betrayal at 
the Yalta conference of 1945 which put Eastern Europeans under Soviet yoke for nearly 
five decades. This claim can be found in Kaczynski’s speech delivered at the party 
congress:  
Example 9: 
As the Law and Justice party, we supported joining the EU even when the 
referendum was taking place. In short, no one can accuse us of anti-Europeanism, despite 
what is being told about us. Moreover, we attach a great value to the European financial 
support. We value it a lot because it makes all types of investments possible, but also […] 
it overcame the inability of the Third Republic to undertake any kind of major enterprises. 
This inability was striking as during first decades nothing had been done in these vast 
fields that require joint effort […]. And that’s right, financial support helped to achieve 
a breakthrough in this case. And I would like to repeat that we value them. But it does not 
mean that we lose the right to judgments of various kinds, including those which pertain 
to the historical and economic context in which financial support is provided. From 
historical perspective, it is important to recall, and our Western critics should be 
reminded of it, that Poland was the first country which opposed German Hitlerism 
militarily (applause). And later, only 17 days later, we were attacked by another 
genocidal totalitarian regime – the Soviet Union. And here comes the question – have we 
received any compensation for those gigantic damages from which we have not fully 
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recovered yet, as it is actually impossible to recover from casualties, especially among 
the elite, which cannot be recovered through up to 5 or 7 generations? The answer is no!  
Interestingly, Kaczynski prefers to use a much broader term anti-European than 
Eurosceptical when he repeals the criticism regarding Law and Justice’s relationship with 
the EU as accusatory and unjustified. PiS chairman shies away from stating Eurosceptical 
character of his party discourse as Euroscepticism itself bears a negative connotations 
which are strongly associated in Poland with right-wing radicalism with which it shares 
its set of moral values and anti-establishment rhetoric, but does not adopt a hard form of 
Euroscepticism with regard to country’s membership in the EU as it would be too 
unpopular with many voters who prefer a moderate approach towards Brussels; they 
might be critical vis-à-vis transferring of decision-making power onto the supranational 
level, but they accept a prominent role of the EU in infrastructural modernization of 
Poland. Therefore, Kaczynski prefers to align with the moderate voices by recognizing 
importance of the EU-sponsored economic support to Poland but re-contextualizes the 
reasons why the state is entitled to receive them. First, they are depicted as helping to 
compensate the shortcomings of economic policies of previous governments and general 
deficit of governance on the state level. Infrastructural development and improvements 
in the quality of public services translate into a desirable lifting of international status of 
the republic. Furthermore, and most importantly, they are presented as a form of historical 
justice vis-à-vis tragic fate of Poles under Nazi and Soviet yoke. Kaczynski posits that 
the economic support of the West cannot overshadow its past wrongdoings and remains 
a subject of moral judgment inalterably also today. As Poland fell victim to the 
expansionism of two hegemonic regimes as the first country during the Second World 
War, current financial support is viewed as an act of late and yet disproportionate 
compensation for its military effort to oppose totalitarianisms, years of national suffering 
under Nazi – Soviet occupation and rejection of financial aid offered by the Marshal plan 
under duress of communists. By accepting EU funds, Poland is exercising its moral right 
to claim full compensation from the West as its ability to preserve and follow the core 
values of freedom and sovereignty had been denied earlier by Western hegemon on one 
hand, and ignored by the Allies at the Yalta conference. Therefore, in Kaczynski’s 
discourse, the EU is expected to take the responsibility for historical record of their 
member states if it is to be viewed as an organization complying with the values of 
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equality, freedom and justice. As Kaczynski often sees Germany as a key driving force 
behind EU policies, his Euroscepticism is often based on criticism of purported German 
hegemony in the EU which is morally unacceptable from a standpoint of Polish raison 
d’etat, where politics of history plays a major role.  
This seemingly history-centric form of Euroscepticism notwithstanding, 
Kaczynski’s discourse is by no means based solely on victimization stemming from 
Poland’s tragic past as it also exploits popular fears and discontent with some of the EU 
policies. Consideration of what can be defined as rights and duties of the EU member 
states which results in the dispute over sovereignty and transfer of authority is employed 
by Kaczynski in order to create a sense of crisis and mobilize his followers through 
demonization of others. Mass influx of refugees and illegal migrants from outside Europe 
which generated a problem of fair distribution and relocation across the EU has become 
a bone of contention between countries which adopted open-door migration policy and 
those which reject it as a breach of sovereignty and serious security concern. What is 
more, mechanisms of relocation are viewed by many political leaders, including 
Kaczynski, as an attempt to interfere in domestic affairs of their countries, or exercise 
hegemonic influence and make smaller states abide by the rules of the mighty. Such 
rhetoric can be found in the following fragment of the party congress speech of 1st July 
2017:  
Example 10:  
As far as European financial support is concerned, companies from these 
countries [Western countries – author’s note] use is to large extent and that is the way 
they make their profit. Polish companies, or rather companies located in Poland, transfer 
billions of Polish zloty to the West every year, without taxes. And, Dear Ladies and 
Gentlemen, this is the context that we must take into account […] Therefore I would like 
to reiterate this – no one shall put us in the position where we will be forced to decide for 
a social catastrophe (applause). All of you have already guessed that I am talking about 
immigrants who are flooding into Europe and their forced relocation. According to the 
approval issued by Prime Minister Kopacz [Prime Minister affiliated with Civic Platform, 
in office 2014 – 2015 – author’s note], there would be 7000 refugees in Poland now. I 
would like to remind you of the case of Finland which took in 100 and has had 26 000 by 
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now, i.e. the proportion is 1-260. In our case, a smaller proportion would be enough to 
cause a huge security problem, and I am not talking about terrorism, Ladies and 
Gentlemen… it is about a common, everyday security. There is no reason to decrease 
radically our standard of life, standard of life of Poles (applause). […] Therefore, I would 
like to tell you today that we did not exploit the countries from which these refugees come 
to Europe. We did not use them as workforce. And finally, we did not call them to come 
to Europe. We have a full moral right to say NO to them! 
Kaczynski makes a distinction between economic and political role of granting 
European financial support to Poland, emphasizing a conflictual relationship between 
them. Although EU funds help develop infrastructure and services, they also support 
foreign enterprises on Polish soil which are meant to increase their revenue while largely 
ignoring state interests through tax evasion etc. Therefore, foreign businesses operating 
on Polish market are perceived by Kaczynski as agents representing interests of their 
countries of origin which do not serve the cause of strengthening sovereignty of Poland 
but make it more dependent on major economic powers. Economic leverage of European 
hegemons operationalized through the control of vast segments of domestic market is 
seen as a sign of declining international status of Poland and growing susceptibility to 
external political pressure in the process of outlining and implementation of common 
policies of the EU which may undermine this status even further. In this context, reference 
to the refugee crisis is supposed to expose imperialist mindset of the West treating Eastern 
Europe as a colonized periphery which it saddles with self-made problems. By yielding 
to the will of the powerful, Poland would jeopardize its security, and thus decrease a 
living standard of its citizens. The example of Finland, though used arbitrarily and without 
any solid argumentation vis-à-vis scarcity of common socio-economic features it shares 
with Poland, is invoked with its perlocutionary force as Kaczynski presents what he sees 
as inevitable damage to the well-being of its citizens if Poland decides to take in refugees 
in comparison to the desirable sense of security, and quality of life. Demonization of 
others as well as otherization of irresponsible elites (Prime Minister Kopacz and her 
cabinet) provide an incentive to consolidate around key components of PiS ideal-type 
organic national morality and voice objection towards what is perceived as neocolonial 
policy of the European superpowers.  
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5.4. Conclusions 
 
Texts selected for the purpose of discourse analysis in this chapter feature a set 
of ideological components characteristic to thin populism, operationalized through a 
national, value-oriented populist rhetoric promoted by Kaczynski. In line with Mudde and 
Kaltwasser’s definition of populism, the author embraces a binary opposition between the 
people and the elite as irreconcilable conflict of interests. A need for change in power 
relations is driven by subjectively acknowledged expectations of citizens with regard to 
moral (ideal) and pragmatic (normative) qualities of state and sense of statesmanship. 
Therefore, Kaczynski’s statements in this respect can be regarded as a manifestation of 
experiential value of his discourse since he presents his experience of the society derived 
from importance traditionally attached to moral values in politics by Law and Justice 
party. Furthermore, as those premises are considered universal and mandatory to secure 
legitimacy, any non-compliance is regarded as a form of de-legitimization as it does not 
match with the core values shared by the people. The elite, as portrayed in Kaczynski’s 
speeches, does not recognize such norms and, by doing so, acts against the popular will 
what renders it illegitimate vis-à-vis the citizenry. The conflict that ensues concerns 
representation as a key feature of political regime advocated for by Kaczynski – although 
the emphasis on people’s will as a source of legitimacy is characteristic to the concept of 
direct democracy as a form of popular rule, it is confronted with a notion of nationalist 
type of good government which respects and shares moral values of the people, but also 
offers a major overhaul in the understanding of the relationship between the people and 
the state where the latter emerges as a quasi-organic entity and serves as a producer and 
provider of goods for the former. The state is thus functionally detached from the people. 
Therefore, Kaczynski seems to favor a strong, state-centric vision of Polish politics, 
manifested best in his concept of raison d’etat, in which the state gains its legitimacy by 
embracing moral values of the people as own and generally binding, and satisfying public 
needs. Kaczynski does not seek, however, to return the power to the people – he reaffirms 
it as the source of legitimacy, but invests the state with the power and authority to exercise 
it.  
For Kaczynski, truth constitutes one of the most important elements of the set of 
moral values appearing in his speeches. In order to be validated, truth needs to be 
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manifested in the public space, and citizens must be made aware of it. As truth is 
tantamount to the subjective understanding of socio-political events, the state in 
Kaczynski’s view assumes a position of the agent of truth – it disseminates it and controls 
it on the basis of moral imperative imposed upon it by the popular will. Therefore, the 
primary accusation Kaczynski makes against the elite is related to the immoral aspect of 
its intentions which renders it ineligible to act as representatives of the people.  
As the binary opposition between the people and the elite extends far beyond the 
boundaries of domestic politics, Kaczynski’s populism manifests itself in his 
Euroscepticism and definition of the EU as community of sovereign nations. Kaczynski 
sees Poland’s membership in this organization as a threat to country’s sovereignty in 
economic and political areas. Although he avoids harsher criticism towards European 
financial support for Polish infrastructure and state services, he highlights threats the 
EU’s liberal policies pose to national moral values, distinct Polish identity and existential 
security of Poles. Furthermore, Kaczynski perceives delegation of power to the 
supranational level as an attempt to impose diktat of Western hegemonic powers on 
Poland (with Germany as the archenemy), inacceptable in the view of Law and Justice’s 
take on politics of history and moral obligation of the West to make amends for past 
crimes.  
Identification of core components of Kaczynski’s populism allows for grouping 
them into orders of discourse according to their specific features with the proviso that all 
of them should be categorized as populist since they reflect the hostility between the 
people and the establishment. The first order of discourse concerns moral evaluation of 
the state as a producer and supplier of goods, and which I shall define as a discourse of 
moral state. As mentioned above, Kaczynski acknowledges state as a supreme value 
which provides instruments to implement decisions based on the will of the sovereign. 
As the state apparatus is captured or appropriated by the elite, it loses popular legitimacy 
based on the concept of democratic representation as it stops reflecting people’s will. By 
regaining control over the state, people regain footing for preservation of their identities 
and distinctiveness vis-à-vis other nations. This sense of control is validated through 
rejection – the moral state, as detached from the people, derives its morality both as a 
result of common values of people, such as memory and truth, but also from evaluation 
of history. Poland, as a moral state, in line with Kaczynski’s reasoning, acts morally when 
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it counters Western dominance on the basis of tragic past experience. Growing 
interdependence and supranational decision-making stands in direct contradiction with 
morality-based state-centrism of Kaczynski’s populism. Therefore, an alienation of the 
elite as representatives of foreign interests and proponents of the pedagogics of shame 
renders them immoral due to rejection of common national values on their part.  
Another order of discourse is related to the sense of crisis, and thus can be 
formulated generally as a discourse of crisis. In the context of Kaczynski speeches cited 
in this chapter, crises inextricably accompany an imaginary people’s struggle for 
preservation of memory and acknowledgment of public truth by the establishment. Crisis 
serves here not only as a mode of mobilization but also consolidation of the narrative 
around several issues central to all selected texts. As the matter of fact, sense of crisis in 
Kaczynski’s discourse pertains to variety of issues – Smolensk tragedy and its 
commemoration, common legacy or EU membership, all of which are intertwined. In the 
first instance, crisis emerges due to state’s inability to enforce popular belief about 
complicity of establishment in bringing about the airplane crash. Any lack of validation 
of such belief in a form of manifestations of state-sanctioned commemoration in public 
space is perceived as a deliberate concealment of truth, which extends far beyond the 
issue of Smolensk catastrophe and becomes a key feature defining hostility towards the 
elite in general. Moreover, domestic crisis develops on the level of national psyche, as 
actions of the establishment prohibit access to truth as a common good on one hand, but 
also encroach on the legacy of a so-called patriotic camp on the other. Similarly, crisis 
can be overcome only by recapturing the state and implementing a sole patriotic moral 
narrative about truth in order to defuse the crisis. On the level of international relations, 
however, crisis is related to unsatisfactory political and economic status of Poland. 
Although European financial support is perceived by Kaczynski as an act of historical 
justice for suffering hardships in the past, it is not equal to improvement of international 
position of the state. Therefore, in his reasoning, Poland is able to reach a desirable 
political status only as a sovereign, morality-guided state. In the context of international 
relations, morality is applied in Kaczynski’s discourse as a defensive aspect of countering 
diffusion of decision-making which he sees as primary manifestation of EU’s 
neocolonialism in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Finally, there are several conclusions one can draw with regard to the 
presentation of reality based on illocutionary acts used by Kaczynski in his speeches. First 
of all, outlining binary opposition between the good and the evil requires use of 
verdictives as manifestations of judgements and proclamations. In the context of 
Kaczynski’s speeches, Example 1 features the use of verdictive speech acts with regard 
to his subjective moral evaluation of actions undertaken by the establishment vis-à-vis 
the role of truth in Polish society. Second, in order to develop his argumentation which 
supports his construct of the socio-political reality, Kaczynski resorts to illocutionary 
force of expositives which systematize his narrative and highlight premises upon which 
he visualizes current and desirable state of political affairs. The use of expositives are best 
demonstrated in Example 4 and 5 where PiS chairman discusses typology of state 
legitimacies derived from moral imperative of public truth. Finally, an extensive use of 
commissives by Kaczynski enables to show his dedication to trigger off a shift in power 
relations between the people and the elite and indicate most appropriate modes of action 
in this regard.  
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6. Chapter Five - Empirical implications of Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s thin-centered 
populism 
 
Social structures are the key element in Fairclough’s model of CDA, and thus, 
along with analysis of discourse practice, deserve proper attention. Having analyzed 
textual properties of Kaczynski’s discourse and having conducted interpretation of 
extracts of selected speeches, I shall proceed to discuss how ideas laid out by PiS 
chairman are reflected in a more tangible form of state legislation, and what socio-
political impact they may have. As pointed out in the chapter 1, since political discourses 
cannot be studied without taking political context into consideration, Kaczynski’s 
discourse should not be analyzed retrospectively, i.e. focusing solely on the links between 
political ideology championed by Law and Justice party throughout years of its presence 
in Polish politics and Kaczynski’s current discourse, but also, in line with Foucault’s 
concept of productive function of power, by looking into products of populist discourse 
which was strengthened by a landslide victory in parliamentary election of 2015 as well 
as an ability to secure an overall majority of the new incumbents enabling them to exercise 
legislative power to unprecedented degree in the history of post-1989 Poland.  
6.1. Preservation of memory – elements of Kaczynski’s discourse in the amended 
bill on the Institute of National Remembrance  
 
 Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) was established in 1998 as a state-
affiliated agency tasked with collecting data and conducting research on the modern 
history of Poland, with a special focus on the period of World War II and communist rule 
in 1944 – 1989. Polish government assigned IPN a range of educational-analytical-
investigative competences related to the preservation of national memory about victims 
of German – Soviet occupation and post-war communist terror, protection and publication 
of documents left after the dissolution of pre-1989 state security agencies as well as 
investigation of crimes against the Polish nation and conducting background checks of 
public officials with regard to their alleged cooperation with communist-time secret 
service. Moreover, the institute was granted powers allowing prosecution of war crimes, 
crimes against peace and mankind (Institute of National Remembrance, 2018). However, 
despite its statutory non-partisanship, IPN has faced criticism for taking form of a quasi-
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ministry involved in re-writing national history and slandering some of the anti-
communist oppositionists and aligning with the political right (Stola, 2012). As the matter 
of fact, the role of IPN in Polish politics has become a subject of fierce debates about 
politicization of memory and promotion of political discourse based on nationalism and 
victimization of Poles. The amendment of law on the National Remembrance Institute, 
often referred to as the Holocaust law (which seems to be an oversimplification, as 
approach towards the Holocaust is just one of many issues brought up in the text of new 
law) has contributed to this image. 
 As Grzebyk argues (Grzebyk, 2017, pp. 288-290), the amendments introduced 
into the law on IPN constituted a Polish government’s response to the shift in 
contemporary public discussion on World War II from concentrating on the scope of Nazi 
crimes in this period towards the extent of collaboration with occupants and complicity 
in crimes perpetrated against local populations. The enactment of amended bill entailed 
a general penalization of denial of Nazi crimes but did not provide a clear definition 
thereof. Moreover, the new law criminalized statements indicating general complicity of 
Poles in Nazi crimes and unilaterally applied the term genocide in the context of mass 
killings of ethnic Poles by Ukrainian nationalists on the territory of Volhynia, but failed 
to apply the same criteria of definition in the case of extermination of Jews. However, the 
most controversial provisions prescribed in the law (Art 55a & 55b) concerned legal 
liability to a fine or restriction of liberty of a person who uses terms prohibited by law as 
defamatory unintentionally or as a result of misinformation, as well as the applicability 
of law irrespective of the place of commission of the prohibited act and offender’s 
nationality (it pertains to Polish citizens and foreigners alike). Therefore, as critics of the 
amended law contended (Machcewicz, 2018) it would result in limiting general debate 
on sensitive historical issues and legitimize only IPN-sanctioned selection and 
presentation of facts. 
 Although the two most controversial provisions were repealed in June 2018, the 
rationale which underpinned proposed amendments to the law on IPN is reminiscent of 
Kaczynski’s discourse of truth. In an interview for the Polish Radio on 29th June 2018 , 
PiS chairman stated that although new regulations remain dead and could not be applied 
without causing negative consequences for our country, they were an expression of what 
he called our story on the World War II that is essentially true. He also believed that 
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thanks to the amended law, Poland was able to achieve the goal called truth and called it 
a success (Kaczynski, 2018). When asked about criticism towards the new law and lack 
of public discussion prior to the enactment of Art 55a and 55b, Kaczynski argued it 
stemmed from a lack of farsightedness regarding potential results of open debate since, 
as he put it, there would be forces in the world, which would block it (Kaczynski, 2018). 
Furthermore, in the response to the question on public outcry it triggered abroad, PiS 
chairman highlighted that opposition against the new law was a result of a growing 
international status of Poland as a country delineating alternative path to the European 
mainstream politics. Finally, when asked whether the record of Polish diplomacy and 
Polish politics of history could have been different had similar legal changes been made 
in the past, Kaczynski argued that rejection of pedagogics of shame which shatters Polish 
sense of confidence and Polish sense of nationality would have had positive impact on 
country’s political position in the world as Poland has a crucial argument [in 
international politics – author’s note] – this argument is truth (Kaczynski, 2018).  
 As a part of politics of history, truth and preservation of memory were a crucial 
factor behind the adoption of new legislation. On the basis of Kaczynski’s words cited 
above, it can be concluded that formalization of a uniform discourse of memory was a 
means to strengthen political status of Poland in the international relations and counter 
discourses regarded as foreign, mendacious and harmful to the reputation of Poland as a 
victim state of the WWII and events that followed it. Although the law turned out to be 
quite counterproductive, as Kaczynski admitted himself, its success was ascribed with 
purely demonstrative value – as long as the truth was expressed, the law proved effective. 
Therefore, highlighting agency of the state in pursuit of truth embedded, as per his words, 
in our story became an apparent manifestation of discourse which permeated legislation 
in order to achieve political goals. Moreover, as can be concluded from Kaczynski’s 
statements, as politics of memory seems to be conducive to the competition of narratives 
and does not to attach importance to the consultation of historical facts between political 
partners as it presupposes that truth lies only with one of them, a rhetoric of such politics 
is meant to reverberate domestically and internationally but does not leave much room 
for open discussion since, as Kaczynski put it, any wider debate on history is perceived 
as standing substantially in sharp opposition to the purposes of politics of memory itself; 
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it becomes a battle around truth, in Foucauldian terms, rather than a presentation of sound 
argumentation derived from solid premises.  
 These controversial provisions of the new law which provide for punishment of 
deliberate and unintentional distortion or denial of historical facts alike seem to serve the 
purpose of domestic consolidation around state-sanctioned discourse. As Kaczynski puts 
a major emphasis on countering other discourses defined under the term pedagogics of 
shame, historical narratives are designed in order to safeguard contemporary interests of 
the state vis-à-vis its citizens, i.e. inculcation of a uniform story which can be adopted as 
ours by the latter. Therefore, politics of history comes about as a useful instrument to 
foster identification of individuals with the state on the basis of absorption of state-
generated historical imaginaries as a set of simplified, re-contextualized assumptions 
which come in handy in explaining current political relations and facilitate identifying 
them as peoples’ own.  
6.2. Elements of Kaczynski’s discourse in judicial reforms in Poland  
 
 Re-writing history is often accompanied by demonization of certain group which 
is considered immoral, corrupt or immune to political changes, and deepening of binary 
opposition between the good and the bad, the righteous and the villains. As Kaczynski’s 
political discourse rests heavily on a populist juxtaposition of the people and the elite on 
one hand, and concept of a peculiar state-centrism combining state interventionism with 
a variety of spheres of socio-economic public activity (the notion of the state as producer 
and supplier of goods) and nationalist, often isolationist political orientation on the other, 
a political program of major systemic overhaul which is frequently referred to as the good 
change (Polish dobra zmiana) has become known as a synonym of purging officials 
critical of the incumbents from public institutions in order to heal the state, i.e. consolidate 
power over its apparatus. As Stanley Bill argues (Bill, 2018), since 2015, Polish judicial 
system has been one of the sub-systems of tripartite separation of powers most affected 
by legal changes in series of laws concerning proceedings of Polish Constitutional Court, 
Supreme Court, merging of competences of Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General 
as well as extension of power as per the new Act on the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
Moreover, the new Act on Common Courts granted Minister of Justice an authority to 
dismiss and appoint new local court presidents. This measure brought about an 
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unprecedented wave of institutional purge, replacing around one-third of heads of local 
courts. Last but not least, PiS politicized the National Council of the Judiciary, an 
constitutional advisory body which includes heads of the Supreme Court, Supreme 
Administrative Court, Minister of Justice, as well as representatives of Polish parliament 
and local courts of various kinds (administrative, civil, military etc.), by changing rules 
of appointment and giving the authority to appoint 15 out of 25 counselors who are mostly 
party affiliates.  
 As explaining the extent of judicial reforms in Poland is beyond the scope of this 
Master’s thesis, I have highlighted briefly the character of changes and most prominent 
legal amendments in order to provide background for further discussion of Kaczynski’s 
discourse which is strongly linked with current remaking of country’s courts. The major 
argument used by the PiS chairman in favor of the top-down overhaul of judicial system 
stems from his vision of corrupt judicial elite which needs to be replaced. In an interview 
for the Polish Radio on 10th February 2017, Kaczynski stated that PiS would get rid of 
widespread pathologies in the judicial system and its policies are based on rejection of all 
these things that stem from previous political system and post-1989 pathologies 
(Kaczynski, 2017). As he pointed out, judiciary as a part of Polish society has been 
corrupted by the hybrid democratic – post-communist political system which needs to be 
cured (Kaczynski, 2017).  
 The judicial reform provides another example how Kaczynski’s discourse feeds 
into adoption of a new legislation. As judiciary as a whole is presented as a closed circuit 
or clique which was incorporated into a new state apparatus after the fall of communism 
and seeks to preserve its privileges it was entitled to for many years, a major systemic 
overhaul cannot be accomplished without changing the judicial system since it remains a 
constitutive element of the binary opposition between the righteous people and the corrupt 
elite. In the interview quoted above, Kaczynski often refers to the judiciary as a 
stronghold of post-communism which generates practices unacceptable from the 
standpoint of the people; as long as interests of the people are neglected by some judges, 
the judiciary as a collectivity is expected to bear a joint accountability for it. Furthermore, 
the perception of the post-1989 Poland as a corrupt hybrid democratic – post-communist 
political system (Kaczynski, 2017) may reinforce the image of democracy as incapable 
of bringing post-communist elites to account and boil it down to a purely procedural 
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mechanism legitimizing the rule of the incumbents but limiting the efficiency of proper 
vetting of public officials. All this accounts for a failed de-communization and 
preservation of pathologies, in Kaczynski’s terms, and requires an immediate action by 
the government truly representing the people’s will. Therefore, politicization of judicial 
system is presented as a legitimate operation which the incumbents carry through thanks 
to their democratic mandate to represent the people.  
6.3. Summary  
 
 This chapter provided an inquiry into how Kaczynski’s populist discourse 
translates into pieces of legislation adopted by the Law and Justice party. The legal acts 
presented herein concern the problems of identity-making (the law on the Institute of 
National Remembrance) and exchange of elites which was an underpinning reason for a 
series of legal acts influencing the current shape of Polish courts, starting from the 
Constitutional Court through local common courts and ending up with the advisory bodies 
such as the National Council of the Judiciary.  
In the first case, the use of discourse was limited to the construction of selective 
historical narrative based on victimization of the Polish nation vis-à-vis German, Soviet 
and Ukrainian crimes committed during World War II and its legal legitimization in a 
form of generally binding penal regulations. As such, the law on IPN seems to be aimed 
at mobilizing the public around revisionist politics of history promoted by the ruling 
party, and thus providing incentives for Poles to embrace the PiS-driven isolationist 
attitude in international relations with other European countries on one hand, and promote 
a vision of state as a repository of collective memory and an advocate of truth on the 
other.  
The reasons behind re-shaping Polish judicial system are slightly different. The 
recent changes which heavily affected country’s judiciary seem to originate from 
Kaczynski’s discourse of crisis and the crucial role of the binary opposition between the 
people and the elite in his vision of politics. Since Polish judges are depicted as an 
alienated clique benefitting from the drawbacks of an incomplete democratic transition, 
and thus constitute part of the post-communist elite, they do not possess popular 
legitimacy to perform public duties. Therefore, the current position of judiciary reflects 
moral crisis of the state apparatus and stands in opposition to Kaczynski’s vision of state-
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centrism because it enjoys constitutionally protected independence from the executive 
and remains immune to the external influences. As its direct responsivity to the popular 
will is limited, the need for more public control and exchange of elite is reinforced.  
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7. Conclusions  
 
 In this Master’s thesis I have attempted to determine characteristics of Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski’s political discourse based on the selection of 5 speeches delivered on various 
occasions, and investigate their relationship with a thin-centered concept of populism. In 
order to conduct my study, I have employed a methodological framework of Critical 
Discourse Analysis developed by Norman Fairclough which enabled to embed my 
research in a comprehensive, three-dimensional model encompassing the analysis on the 
level of text, discursive practice, i.e. production and interpretation of texts, and social 
practice involving its impact on the society and political processes. The analysis has 
brought several interesting results.  
Among the core concepts upon which Kaczynski’s political discourse rests I have 
identified the following:  
- Morality as a concept underpinning the emergence of the populist binary 
opposition between the people and the elite,  
- Truth viewed as a moral quality fundamental to the politics of memory and 
national identity,  
- The idea of collective memory as a carrier of truth upon which Kaczynski builds 
his concept of offensive and defensive politics of memory  
- State-centrism intertwined with the notion of organic state as a producer and 
supplier of goods that enjoys popular legitimacy, but exercises sovereign power 
and authority on behalf of the people,  
- Core values – freedom, equality and justice are listed by Kaczynski as constitutive 
to the concept of solidarity-based Poland as a counterbalance to liberalism.  
Textual analysis of selected speeches have brought several interesting results. 
First, selected texts feature a high degree of repetitions which strengthen communication 
of author’s ideas given the context of their delivery. Among the most frequent ones are 
those which serve the presentation and reinforcement of the juxtaposition between the 
people and the elite. Kaczynski often employs a pronoun we or possessive determiner our 
vis-à-vis they and their in reference to the preservation of our memory or dedication to 
our state. What is distinctive of the speeches invoked in this thesis is that Kaczynski very 
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often uses modal verbs together with the pronouns we and they in order to express 
obligations and build his argumentation upon presentation of alternative options or 
aftermath of inaction (we must win, we must explain, we must protect, we must remember, 
they cannot win). Second, as concepts of morality, memory and truth are of crucial 
importance for creation of imaginaries in his discourse, they are frequent points of 
reference for Kaczynski’s rhetoric, as the adjective moral appears five times across the 
texts, memory – six, and truth – eight. Finally, his account of the state-centrism makes 
the word state one of the most extensively used throughout analyzed texts, as it is 
mentioned seventeen times.  
In line with Austin’s classification of speech acts, a wide range of illocutions can 
be found in selected texts. As Kaczynski discourse draws on moral judgements of 
intentions and actions on both sides of the populist binary opposition, the role of 
verdictives is crucial to the creation of imaginaries about political reality. Furthermore, 
Kaczynski employs expositives as a part of his argumentation for challenging existing 
status quo and advancing own vision of elite change and state-centrism which is supported 
by an extensive use of commissives, i.e. demonstration of commitment to proposed 
changes.  
As far as the question of ideational and discursive populism is concerned, political 
relations are depicted according to the binary opposition which renders co-existence of 
the people and the elite irreconcilable due to their political aims. Although Kaczynski 
speaks from the position of the leader of party in power, he stretches his concept of the 
establishment to include representatives of opposition, the EU, Polish judiciary etc., in 
order to highlight a spectrum of behind-the-scenes operations to deny access to power for 
representatives of the people. Kaczynski presents his experience of the nation and the 
state as uniform, morality-driven entities, the values of which do not correspond to 
liberalism. Therefore his ideational populism rests on the thin-centered populism, or 
rather its ideological thinness, whereas the discursive populism manifests itself through a 
range of rhetorical measures with ideational populism in its core, such as claiming the 
right to speak on behalf of citizens, legitimization of own action and de-legitimization of 
those undertaken by others based on a subjective sense of morality, development of the 
victimization narrative and pursuit of historical justice in relations with foreign countries 
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as well as selective use historical events in order to promote current political interests, as 
exemplified by the politics of memory.  
Given the importance of social practice in Fairclough’s model, Kaczynski’s 
speeches as social events are intertwined with social practice as they translate into 
legislative actions undertaken by the ruling party and agencies de facto subordinate to it. 
The pieces of legislation invoked in the last chapter demonstrate how Kaczynski’s 
interpretation of people’s desires for political change is reflected in reality. As 
demonstrated by the adoption of amendments to the law on the Institute of National 
Remembrance and the major legislative overhaul of Polish judicial system, Kaczynski’s 
populist concept of the people – elite cleavage as well as construction of a new national 
– moral identity supported by a range of state-imposed values has an important bearing 
on the provisions of newly-enacted legislation as they are built upon the axis of memory 
– morality – truth.  
The law on IPN envisages penalization of attaching blame to the Polish nation and 
the state for Nazi war crimes committed on the territory of Poland and criminalizes both 
intentional and unintentional distortion or denial of historical record of German, Soviet 
and Ukrainian war crimes. Although the original law was meant to safeguard reputation 
of Poles as victims of totalitarian occupation and counter false accusations of general 
complicity of Poland in the World War II crimes, the amendments introduced by the 
ruling Law and Justice party served as an instrument of national consolidation around the 
narrative of victimization, and provided countermeasures against the so-called 
pedagogics of shame, i.e. belittling historical achievements of Poland and criticism (often 
emotional) of historical events seen as revisionist, breaking up national unity and 
damaging national identity of Poles. In light of Kaczynski’s rhetoric, the new law seemed 
to constitute an effort to fend off competitive discourses through a state-sanctioned 
mythmaking and selective presentation of historical facts. Furthermore, as politics of 
memory remains crucial to Kaczynski’s understanding of raison d’état, history becomes 
a common platform for bolstering a uniform set of historical truths which can be re-
contextualized according to political needs of the moment.  
As stated above, far-reaching judicial reforms were underpinned by slightly 
different motivations. Polish judges are presented by Kaczynski as a clique consisting of 
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people with communist past who kept their posts as a result of moral decay of democratic 
elites. Thus, judiciary as a whole fell victim to Kaczynski’s discourse of populism as it 
was presented as a part of alienated establishment benefitting from their offices, and 
placed on the side of elite as per the binary opposition essential to Kaczynski’s thin-
centered populism. Furthermore, the image of judiciary supports necessity of major 
systemic change as a part of the moral battle around the state – as long as the state is gains 
legitimacy from the people in order to perform its functions of producing and 
disseminating goods and services, this legitimacy seems to be unilaterally cancelled by 
the people if, in Kaczynski’s terms, it acts against the morality of its citizens. As a result 
of de-legitimization of elites, the new government introduced a number of reforms which, 
however, do not empower the people and enable them to exercise a direct authority, but 
in a way detach the state from its source of legitimization while providing the people with 
incentives to choose in favor of interventionist solidarity-based model of government.  
All in all, a study of Kaczynski’s speeches in light of Critical Discourse Analysis 
contributes to a broader understanding of the influence of populism as a thin ideology on 
public discourse and political developments alike. However, even though an analysis of 
social cleavages remains beyond the scope of this Master’s thesis, a phenomenon of rifts 
between proponents of the solidarity-based and liberal Poland as a product of Kaczynski’s 
political discourse deserves much attention as it may complement the research on the 
impact it has on perceptions of the Polish state and society itself and a study of political 
discourse in Poland.   
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